Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Crowther, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s10670-006-0001-3

Cited by 35 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(2 reference statements)

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“…Crowther 2006;Heck 2000;Laurier 2004;Speaks 2005;Tye 2006). On the first-which following Heck's terminology, I'll call the content view-when we claim that the content of perceptual experiences is nonconceptual, we say something about the kind of content that perceptual experiences, as opposed to e.g.…”

Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been used in an attempt to show that most arguments in favour of perceptual nonconceptualism succeed only in establishing the truth of SNC, but leave CNC unsupported (Speaks 2005;Crowther 2006). Take, for instance, the so-called fineness of grain argument, based on the idea that our perceptual experiences outstrip our perceptual concepts (see e.g.…”

Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typically the T1 theorist (e.g. Byrne 2005;Crowther 2006;Speaks 2005, Stalnaker 1998) portrays such a notion in terms of functions from possible worlds to truth-values or Russellian propositions. Yet, sets of possible worlds are seriously flawed as a way of capturing not only the fine-grained content of perception, but also the fine-grained content of belief.…”

Section: The Logical Independence Of Snc and Cnc: Content And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is because, thus characterised, the content of propositions need not be sensitive to the way in which an agent takes the world to be. Since both conceptualists and nonconceptualists hold this requirement as essential to the very notion of content, we can easily see that, in 5 But see Crowther (2006) for an argument in support of T2 as a coherent and well-motivated position, which he uses to justify the claim that standard arguments in favour of perceptual conceptualism also fall short of establishing the view. I believe T2 suffers from the same kind of problems as T1, but I will not argue for such a claim here.…”

Section: The Logical Independence Of Snc and Cnc: Content And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

Toribio

2008

Erkenn

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It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn't possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all.

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Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Versions Of Perceptual Nonconceptualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Logical Independence Of Snc and Cnc: Content And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Logical Independence Of Snc and Cnc: Content And Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

Toribio

2008

Erkenn

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“…2 These arguments have always been controversial, but they have recently been criticized using a new tactic. It has been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different interpretations (see, e.g., Crowther, 2006;Heck, 2000;Laurier, 2004;Speaks, 2005;Tye, 2006). On the first one, nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual states, as opposed to, e.g., beliefs, have.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compositionality, iconicity, and perceptual nonconceptualism

Toribio¹

2011

Philosophical Psychology

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This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state-content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ''state-content error error,'' i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception.

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Aesthetic Optimism

Sopuck¹

2021

The Aesthetics of Horror Films

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Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Cited by 35 publications

References 15 publications

State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

Compositionality, iconicity, and perceptual nonconceptualism

Aesthetic Optimism

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