twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics: how to cope with complexity?

Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan

doi:10.1057/s41304-017-0129-4

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 61 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Previous literature has proved that the power of public supervision cannot be underestimated 41 . As the initiator of the SC project, the government’s attitude greatly influences the construction quality and the behavior of other participants 42 .…”

Section: Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model From the Perspective Of P...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Zhao

Liu

Wang

2022

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Sponge City Public Private Partnership (PPP) project is a significant step to promote the construction of resilient city and sustainable development. Private companies take advantage of information asymmetry and regulatory loopholes to take opportunistic behavior, which affects the project delivery quality and public interests. In order to reveal the decision-making mechanism of the main stakeholders, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of private companies, citizens and the government from a fresh perspective of perceived value. First, the traditional payoff matrix is modified by combining Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting. Next, this paper analyzes the strategic evolution law and stability conditions of game players by replicated dynamic equation. Finally, Nanganqu project is used for empirical simulation to verify the effectiveness of this model. Results indicate that, (1) due to the complexity of the project and the bounded rationality of the participants, there is no evolutionary stable strategy in this game system. (2) The behavioral decision of participants is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs. (3) Government punishment and reputation loss can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior. All above studies are expected to improve the management of Sponge City PPP projects, providing theoretical guidance for the government to make scientific decisions.

show abstract

Section: Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model From the Perspective Of P...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Zhao

Liu

Wang

2022

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The central task behind the theory is to study how a principal can formulate the optimal contracts to encourage the agent to work hard (Garcı´a, 2014;Sappington, 1991). The incentive theory has become an important part of the principal-agent theory (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2018). In a market economy environment, a contractor's behavior is driven by the motivation to maximize his/her own interests, which may lead to moral hazard behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects

Han

Shen

et al. 2022

SAGE Open

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Large-scale projects play an important role in social and economic development. Recently, large-scale projects are becoming more complex with more uncertainties and risks during the construction, which leads to more complex and extensive management problems. In a large-scale project, there is a principal-agent relationship between the contractor and owner. The contractor may take moral hazard behavior to pursue his/her own interests due to the information asymmetry and conflict of interest, which could damage to the public and owner’s interests. Based on the principal-agent theory, a dynamic incentive model combining explicit and implicit incentives was constructed in large-scale projects, after analyzing the mechanism of reputation effects. A comparison was made between two scenarios. One scenario considered reputation effects; the other did not consider reputation effects. The results show that the contractor would be more inclined to make optimal efforts in the large-scale project after reputation effects are introduced, and this optimal effort level will improve with the increased influence degree of reputation effects. However, the contractor’s degree of risk aversion will weaken the incentive effects. In addition, compared to an explicit incentive, the reputation mechanism of an implicit incentive will increase the owner’s benefits. The findings not only provide important support for the owner to formulate relevant incentive clauses in the construction contract, but also has important practical significance for the construction of the micro-institutional environment in construction projects. This study did not take into account factors such as regulatory efficiency when establishing the reputation incentive model. How to combine reputational incentives with the degree of supervision will be the direction of future research.

show abstract

“…To this end, the research note introduces a research strategy advocating the use of the Principal-Agent approach as a heuristic device to empirically study the determinants of domestic parliaments' influence on EU affairs. While the use of the Principal-Agent in legislative studies is not new in itself, the Principal-Agent literature has been increasingly fragmented across (sub)disciplines of the social sciences in the last years (Delreux and Adriaensen 2018). Therefore, one of the novelties of this research note is that it tries to 'reconnect' empirical works on national parliaments and the EU with the most recent developments of the model, and in particular applications of the latter in the field of EU studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studying the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs: reconnecting empirical research and the Principal-Agent approach

Randour

2021

Political Research Exchange

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The literature on national parliaments and the EU has built up its knowledge on the strength and activities of domestic parliaments in the European Union. While these studies were of outmost importance to understand how and why parliaments and MPs act on EU affairs, we still know little on the influence of domestic parliaments on the EU policy of their executive and on EU policymaking more generally. The article first presents the current gaps in knowledge as well as the challenges to study the influence of parliaments in EU affairs and ends by presenting a research strategy which advocates 'reconnecting' empirical works on national parliaments and the EU with the Principal-Agent model. This research agenda could foster new theoretical and empirical studies with important implications for the debate on the (re)parliamentarisation of the European Union as well as on EU negotiations.

show abstract

twenty years of principal-agent research in EU politics: how to cope with complexity?

Cited by 11 publications

References 61 publications

Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects

Studying the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs: reconnecting empirical research and the Principal-Agent approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About