Evolutionary game analysis of opportunistic behavior of Sponge City PPP projects: a perceived value perspective

Abstract

Sponge City Public Private Partnership (PPP) project is a significant step to promote the construction of resilient city and sustainable development. Private companies take advantage of information asymmetry and regulatory loopholes to take opportunistic behavior, which affects the project delivery quality and public interests. In order to reveal the decision-making mechanism of the main stakeholders, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of private companies, citizens and the government from a fresh perspective of perceived value. First, the traditional payoff matrix is modified by combining Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting. Next, this paper analyzes the strategic evolution law and stability conditions of game players by replicated dynamic equation. Finally, Nanganqu project is used for empirical simulation to verify the effectiveness of this model. Results indicate that, (1) due to the complexity of the project and the bounded rationality of the participants, there is no evolutionary stable strategy in this game system. (2) The behavioral decision of participants is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs. (3) Government punishment and reputation loss can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior. All above studies are expected to improve the management of Sponge City PPP projects, providing theoretical guidance for the government to make scientific decisions.

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