Search citation statements
Paper Sections
Citation Types
Year Published
Publication Types
Relationship
Authors
Journals
This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.
In a series of articles in this journal, Dan Ló pez De Sa and Elia Zardini (2006, 2007) (forthwith 'LSZ') have argued that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, LSZ claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. According to them (2007: 246), '[w]hat really seems to be the essence [of the notion of 'paradox'] is that, despite the apparent validity of the argument, the premises do not rationally support the conclusion'. It is our contention here that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, LSZ's arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show. With their broader reading of 'paradox' in hand, LSZ argue that a number of philosophers-principally, Roy Sorensen, but also the present authors (given our attack on Sorensen (2001)) and several others-are guilty of wielding 'paradoxical' arguments, and, what is worse, of using them in the service of establishing substantial philosophical claims. 1 They contend that we must reject such 'paradoxical' reasoning and that this is so, even if the theses these theorists aim to establish are true. As we will show, LSZ's attacks fail to establish these cases of reasoning as paradoxical (even in their broader sense). However, this result does not offer any support to the idea that it is possible to establish substantive philosophical claims through nothing but abstract formal reasoning. This is because at least part of what must be addressed in the cases that LSZ consider is how we should think about the sorts of philosophical arguments they aim to depose. In clarifying this below, we briefly highlight the notion of a plausibility argument, namely, an argument made in support of a thesis, though without the aim of a (formal) proof. We take this kind of argument to be what is really at work in most of the cases LSZ consider, along with much of contemporary philosophy. The plan is as follows. In x1, we consider some of the background for Sorensen's epistemicism regarding certain indeterminate cases. Then, in x2, we explain his general approach to certain puzzling semantic cases and the assumptions that drive it. In x3, we explain Sorensen's position on the case of central concern in LSZ's argument, and in x4, we review their criticism of Sorensen's reasoning. In xx5-6, we critically evaluate LSZ's attack on
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.