Truth in Frege's ?law of truth?

Kemp, Gary

doi:10.1007/bf01064102

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…34 Textor (2010) and Jarvis (2012) develop related ideas. 35 See also development of this argument by Kemp (1998) and the reply by Heck (2002). 36 The depth of Frege's commitment to this view is not clear, however.…”

Section: Closing: Frege and Deflationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Log97, This argument is extremely puzzling. Some commentators have found in it an argument that there is no real property of truth at all (Ricketts, 1986;Kemp, 1995). But one would need a very strong argument indeed for this sort of claim, since there are so many places in Frege's writings where he seems to make serious use of semantic notions like reference and truth (Heck, 2010;Heck, 2012, Ch.…”

Section: The Regress Argument: Why Truth Is Not a Predicatementioning

confidence: 99%

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Truth in Frege

Heck

May

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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A general survey of Frege’s views on truth, the chapter explores the problems in response to which Frege’s distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. Particular attention is paid to Frege’s early engagement with the work of George Boole, how the notion of truth-functionality emerges from it, and the tensions in Frege’s notion of content that this exposes. It also discusses Frege’s view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth, which has been the focus of much of the literature concerning Frege on truth. Finally, the chapter considers, very briefly, the question whether Frege was, as is so often claimed, a deflationist.

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Section: Closing: Frege and Deflationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Regress Argument: Why Truth Is Not a Predicatementioning

confidence: 99%

Truth in Frege

Heck

May

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…Views in this vincinity have been expressed by van Heijenoort (1967),Dreben and van Heijenoort (1986),Ricketts (1986a;1986b),Weiner (1990),Kemp (1995), andGoldfarb (2001),…”

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confidence: 92%

The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number

Heck¹

2019

Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic

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“…We borrow the term 'content-redundancy' from GaryKemp (1998). Kemp understands the argument differently from how we do, but we think he was right to highlight the connection between it and the regress argument.…”

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confidence: 99%

Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language

Heck

May

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

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Gottlob Frege's contributions to philosophy of language are so numerous and so fundamental that it is difficult to imagine the field without them. This article discusses Frege's apparently metaphysical doctrine that concepts are ‘unsaturated’. It argues that it is primarily a semantic thesis, an essential ingredient of Frege's conception of compositionality. It next discusses Frege's conception of truth. It argues that his seemingly puzzling doctrine that sentences denote objects, namely, truth-values, emerges from considerations about the logic of sentential connectives and the semantics of predicates and embodies an understanding of why, as Frege sees it, logic is so intimately concerned with the notion of truth. The article then turns to Frege's notion of a thought and, more generally, the distinction between sense and reference.

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Truth in Frege's ?law of truth?

Cited by 14 publications

References 7 publications

Truth in Frege

Truth in Frege

The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number

Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language

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