Truth in Frege

Abstract

A general survey of Frege’s views on truth, the chapter explores the problems in response to which Frege’s distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. Particular attention is paid to Frege’s early engagement with the work of George Boole, how the notion of truth-functionality emerges from it, and the tensions in Frege’s notion of content that this exposes. It also discusses Frege’s view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth, which has been the focus of much of the literature concerning Frege on truth. Finally, the chapter considers, very briefly, the question whether Frege was, as is so often claimed, a deflationist.

Modes of Truth

“…57. For defense of the interpretive claims made here, and some caveats, see Heck and May (2018). 58.…”

Does Frege Have a Metalinguistic Truth-Predicate in Begriffsschrift?

“…Writing down "2 þ 3 = 5" cannot be asserting that 2 þ 3 is 5 because it is not identifying the Truth with 2 þ 3 = 5. I believe that it is in Frege's assimilation of assertion with identification that the standard interpretation of assertion (judgment) in Frege (Burge 1986;Dummett 1993;Heck and May 2018;Heck 2012) is grounded. For instance, Heck (2012, sec.…”

Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings

“…The speaker-reference provides a model for the kind of identification Frege needs when he characterize judgment as identification. In particular, judging that p is comparable to referring to the True by 'p', as Heck and May (2018), Heck (2007; 2012) and Textor (2010) point out.…”

“…We cannot avoid this problem by saying that Φ is the same as [Φ] is the True and so the infinite regress is not vicious. For the additional component of judging that Φ cannot be the act of judging that Φ itself.The above infinite regress is something Frege is well aware of, according to a number of commentators(Heck 2007;2012;Heck & May 2018;Kremer 2000;Pagin 2001;…”