Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons”

Second to fourth digit ratio and cooperative behavior

“…Glazer & Komad, 1996;Roberts, 1998;Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Consistent with the costly signaling perspective on altruism, altruistic behavior has been shown to be 2D:4D and cooperative behavior 5 competitive on some occasions (Barclay, 2004), and has been shown to increase status, both in fieid settings (Bliege-bird, Smith, & Bird, 2001) and in lab situations (Dewitte & De Cremer, 2004).…”

ESG Issues among Fund Managers—Factors and Motives

“…Engaging in prosocial behaviors-in our case, ESG investment practices-can establish a reputation of being more trustworthy among peers [63][64][65]. Thus, the chances of acquiring more friends, allies, romantic partners [66] and higher status in a group [67] are increased.…”

Evolutionary game theory meets social science: Is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?

“…Public goods games are such cases. Surely, withholding cooperation has a similar effect to costly punishment when pair-wise DR or IR interactions are linked to PGGs (Milinski et al 2002;Barclay 2004). But this arrangement is not always feasible in real life: if defectors can intimidate others into transferring benefits, the few that can resist intimidation will not achieve deterrence without costly punishment.…”

“…In the added second stage, co-operators can punish defectors dyadically -the game-theoretic context for a DR strategy -by withholding benefits from them or by not choosing them for interaction at all (Rosas 2008b). Milinski et al (2002) experimented with an IR game in the second stage; an experiment with DR in the second stage has also been conducted, with the same effect (Barclay 2004). Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) produced the model corresponding to Milinski's experiment and found that IR can enforce cooperation "without the second-order free rider problem", i.e., without biological altruism.…”