Trusted Authority Assisted Three‐Factor Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for the Implantable Medical System

Abstract

The application of implantable medical devices (IMDs), which solves the problems of geographical distance limitation and real-time health monitoring that plague patients and doctors, has caused great repercussions in the medical community. Despite the great potential of wide application, it also brings some security and privacy issues, such as the leakage of health data and unauthorized access to IMDs. Although a number of authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been developed, we find that some subtle attacks still remain to be addressed. Then we propose an improved AKA scheme which achieves strong security features including user anonymity and known key security. It is formally proved to be secure under the Real-or-Random model. Moreover, a comprehensive security analysis shows that our scheme can resist various attacks and satisfy the desired requirements. Finally, the performance analysis shows the superiority of our protocol which is suitable for the implantable medical system.

Efficient and Provably Secure Anonymous User Authentication Scheme for Patient Monitoring Using Wireless Medical Sensor Networks

“…We provide the comparative analysis of our scheme and some representative schemes [24], [27], [37] in this section. When evaluating the computation and communication overheads, we concern with the login and authentication phase.…”

“…Li et al's scheme [37] is vulnerable to various weaknesses like forgery attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay attack, etc. Mao et al's scheme [24] provides many security attributes, but is flawed with known session-specific temporary information attack.…”

“…The total running time of our scheme is 21.02 + 15 * 0.5 + 4 * 21.02 + 1.896 + 3.481 = 117.977ms. The total running time of the relevant schemes [24], [27], [37] are 515.6 ms, 456.525 ms, 387.95 ms, respectively.…”

“…However, their protocol was observed to have weaknesses like no forward secrecy. Mao et al [24] provided a biometrics-based authentication protocol employing elliptic curve cryptosystem. Unfortunately, their protocol involves session key exposure when the nonce is compromised.…”

IMDfence: Architecting a Secure Protocol for Implantable Medical Devices

“…Wazid et al [24] and Mao et al [25] propose three-factor protocols, which rely on passwords, smart cards, and biometrics. Their protocols rely on a reader-registration phase before the IMD deployment in the field.…”