Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force

Friebel, Guido; Kosfeld, Michael; Thielmann, Gerd

doi:10.1257/mic.20170389

Cited by 32 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…Our paper contributes to three different strands in the literature. First, the results relate to a recent set of empirical studies analyzing the selection into public service (Dohmen and Falk, 2010;Serra et al, 2011;Dal Bó et al, 2013;Hanna and Wang, 2017;Barfort et al, 2019;Deserranno, 2019;Friebel et al, 2019;Ashraf et al, 2020). Results in Banuri and Keefer (2016) and Deserranno (2019) are closest to our paper as they also document the selection of pro-socially motivated individuals via low wages.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 52%

Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

2021

Self Cite

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We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the lowincentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 52%

Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

2021

Self Cite

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“…There is also related evidence on sorting by pro-social "mission-oriented" types into the public sector (Carpenter and Myers, 2010;Gregg, et al, 2011;Buurman, et al, 2012;Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014;Fisman et al, 2015;Hanna and Wang, 2017;Ashraf, et al, 2019;Friebel, Kosfeld and Thielmann, 2019). However, none of this work tests how differential sorting by heterogeneous types impacts labor market outcomes such as wages.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Sorting and Wage Premiums in Immoral Work

Schneider

Brun²,

Weber

2020

SSRN Journal

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We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative labor-market data to study how heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers' aversion to acting immorally interact to impact labor market outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether those individuals least concerned with acting morally select into jobs generally perceived as immoral and whether the aversion among many individuals to performing such acts contributes to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating differential. We show that immoral work is associated with higher wages, both using correlational evidence from administrative labor-market data and causal evidence from a laboratory experiment. We also measure individuals' aversion to performing immoral acts and show that those who find immoral behavior least aversive are more likely to be employed in immoral work in the lab and have a relative preference for work perceived as immoral outside the laboratory. We note that sorting by "immoral" types into jobs that can cause harm may be detrimental for society. Our study highlights the value of employing complementary research methods.

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“…Empirical results suggest that law enforcement agents in reality “care” about outcomes independent of their monetary consequences. The evidence presented in Friebel, Kosfeld, and Thielmann (2019) indicates that intrinsically motivated and trustworthy individuals self‐select into the German Police Force. Dickinson, Masclet, and Villeval (2015) report similar results using police commissioners from France.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops

Friehe

Mungan

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium. 1 | INTRODUCTION Crime detection and prevention are two important duties performed by police officers every day. To better fulfill these duties, the law often permits police officers to stop a person based upon reasonable suspicion that he may be involved in criminal activity, where reasonable suspicion is a weaker requirement than probable cause (which is required for an arrest, to conduct a search, and for a search warrant). A commonly voiced concern is that police officers often cross the fine line to be observed when trading off fighting crime against the protection of individual rights. For example, a common complaint against New York City's stop-and-frisk program was that stops were used with little focus on stopping those most likely to be engaged in crime (e.g.

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Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force

Cited by 32 publications

References 52 publications

Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods

Sorting and Wage Premiums in Immoral Work

The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops

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