Trust establishment in cooperative wireless networks

Changiz, Reyhaneh; Halabian, Hassan; Yu, F. Richard; Lambadaris, Ioannis; Tang, Helen; Peter, C. Mason

doi:10.1109/milcom.2010.5680086

Cited by 21 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In wireless networks that contain one or multiple inherently trusted nodes the usual approach is to employ these trusted nodes as authentication servers that distribute keys (or certificates) to other nodes in order to establish and manage trust relationships among them [3]- [10]. In networks that do not contain any inherently trusted nodes, trust is primarily quantified using trust metrics that are evaluated through nodes interacting with and observing the behaviors of each other [11]- [16]. Equipped with the trust metric values, trust relationships among nodes can then be established and maintained via inference [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of channel degradation attack by Intermediary Node in Linear Networks

Graves

Wong

2012

2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM

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We consider the problem of two sources wanting to share information through a potentially untrustworthy intermediary node. We assume that the two sources transmit random symbols simultaneously and that the intermediary node relays the information in the amplify-and-forward manner. We show that under a certain sufficient condition on the channel, it is possible to asymptotically detect whether or not the intermediary node is degrading the channel by sending out manipulated symbols. This can be done solely by each source examining its received distribution conditioned on what it transmitted; thus allowing for a minimally invasive approach to determining if the intermediary node is acting maliciously. More specifically, we model the potential malicious action of the intermediate node by an "attack" channel. An estimate of the attack channel is obtained from the received conditional distribution empirically observed by a source node. We show that the estimated attack channel converges in probability to the true attack channel if the intermediate node is not acting maliciously. Otherwise there is a separation between the estimated and true attacking channels with high probability. This result provides us a clear-cut criterion to determine whether the intermediate node is malicious or not.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of channel degradation attack by Intermediary Node in Linear Networks

Graves

Wong

2012

2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM

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“…The distribution of θ[m] is assumed available at the destination based on the record of misbehavior detections [10]. If this is the case, combining the received signal y d, 2 [m] with y d, 1 [m] is harmful to the signal demodulation at the destiation.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, the maximum number of the received signal points serves as a favorable measure to determine the relaying behavior. Assume that the a priori probability that the relay node behaves cooperatively or maliciously is known at the destination, which can be achieved through the record of the relay behavior [10]. Based on the maximum a posteriori (MAP) criterion, the relay is detected as behaving cooperatively if…”

Section: Noncoherence Detection Of Misbehaving Relaymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Blind detections lead to higher efficiency since tracing symbols are not necessarily to be generated and inserted. Moreover, constructing the trustworthiness of each relay based on the results of misbehavior detection within a long period has been developed as well [10], [11]. The quantity of trustworthiness can be adopted to estimate the a priori probability that each relay behaves maliciously [10] or identify the attack model of each relay [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, constructing the trustworthiness of each relay based on the results of misbehavior detection within a long period has been developed as well [10], [11]. The quantity of trustworthiness can be adopted to estimate the a priori probability that each relay behaves maliciously [10] or identify the attack model of each relay [11]. To perform misbehavior detections, one common assumption of the aforementioned works is that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the cooperative networks is perfectly known at the destination.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Misbehavior Detection Without Channel Information in Cooperative Networks

Huang

2011

2011 IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Fall)

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In this work, we consider a canonical three-node DF cooperative network where the relay may misbehave with a certain probability. Without misbehavior detection, diversity combining at the destination may degrade system performance severely if the relay misbehaves. Most existing work of misbehavior detections requires perfect channel state information (CSI), which may not be achievable since the retransmitted symbols are garbled by the malicious relays. With this regard, we propose a two-tier approach to detect misbehaving relay in quasi-static relay channel. By measuring the average received energy and observing the distribution of the phase rotations of the tracing symbols, misbehavior of the relay can be determined without CSI. As shown in simulations, error performance of the proposed scheme is close to the case with perfect misbehavior detection.

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Trust establishment in cooperative wireless relaying networks

Changiz

Halabian

et al. 2012

Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput.

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In cooperative wireless networks, relay nodes are employed to improve the performance of the network in terms of throughput and reliability. However, the presence of malicious relay nodes in the network may severely degrade the performance of the system. When a relay node behaves maliciously, there exists a possibility that such a node refuses to cooperate when it is selected for cooperation or deliberately drops the received packets. Trust establishment is a mechanism to detect misbehaving nodes in a network. In this paper, we propose a trust establishment method for cooperative wireless networks by using Bayesian framework. In contrast with the previous schemes proposed in wireless networks, this approach takes the channel state information and the relay selection decisions into account to derive a pure trust value for each relay node. The proposed method can be applied to any cooperative system with a general relay selection policy whose decisions in each cooperative transmission are independent of the previous ones. Moreover, it does not impose additional communication overhead on the system as it uses the available information in relay selection procedure. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Trust establishment in cooperative wireless networks

Cited by 21 publications

References 17 publications

Detection of channel degradation attack by Intermediary Node in Linear Networks

Detection of channel degradation attack by Intermediary Node in Linear Networks

Misbehavior Detection Without Channel Information in Cooperative Networks

Trust establishment in cooperative wireless relaying networks

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