Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G.

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.006

Cited by 407 publications

(334 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Harbaugh et al (2003), who study 310 subjects aged 7 to 18, find that young children behave more selfishly in dictator games than do older subjects. The same pattern is found for second-mover behavior in trust games -where second movers play basically a dictator game -by Sutter and Kocher (2007). Fehr et al (2008) show in an experiment with 229 children that inequality aversion develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 62%

Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and age — An experiment in Austria and Sweden

et al. 2011

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 62%

Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and age — An experiment in Austria and Sweden

et al. 2011

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“…They reported that increasing age is associated with higher trust. Sutter and Kocher (2007) examined trust and trustworthiness in different age groups and they reported a linear increase from early childhood to early adulthood. Within the different adult age groups, however, trust remains constant.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inconsistency and social decision making in patients with Borderline Personality Disorder

Preuss

Brändle

Hager

et al. 2016

Psychiatry Research

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Inconsistent social behavior is a core psychopathological feature of borderline personality disorder. The goal of the present study was to examine inconsistency in social decision-making using simple economic social experiments. We investigated the decisions of 17 female patients with BPD, 24 patients with major depressive disorder (MDD), and 36 healthy controls in three single shot economic experiments measuring trust, cooperation, and punishment. BPD severity was assessed using the Zanarini Rating Scale for BPD. Investments across identical one-shot trust and punishment games were significantly more inconsistent in BPD patients than in controls. Such inconsistencies were only found in the social risk conditions of the trust and punishment conditions but not in the non-social control conditions. MDD patients did not show such inconsistencies. Furthermore, social support was negatively correlated with inconsistent decision-making in the trust and punishment game, which underscores the clinical relevance of this finding.

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“…Some papers have studied children playing games with a focus on fairness and trustworthiness (distinct from truthfulness) in ultimatum and trust games (10)(11)(12); this literature builds on earlier experimental economics research with children (13)(14)(15). Sally and Hill (16) examined the effects of autism on children's performance in games, with a focus on fairness.…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Children’s strategic theory of mind

Sher¹,

Koenig

Rustichini³

2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Human strategic interaction requires reasoning about other people's behavior and mental states, combined with an understanding of their incentives. However, the ontogenic development of strategic reasoning is not well understood: At what age do we show a capacity for sophisticated play in social interactions? Several lines of inquiry suggest an important role for recursive thinking (RT) and theory of mind (ToM), but these capacities leave out the strategic element. We posit a strategic theory of mind (SToM) integrating ToM and RT with reasoning about incentives of all players. We investigated SToM in 3-to 9-y-old children and adults in two games that represent prevalent aspects of social interaction. Children anticipate deceptive and competitive moves from the other player and play both games in a strategically sophisticated manner by 7 y of age. One game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium: In this game, children achieve equilibrium play by the age of 7 y on the first move. In the other game, with a single mixedstrategy equilibrium, children's behavior moved toward the equilibrium with experience. These two results also correspond to two ways in which children's behavior resembles adult behavior in the same games. In both games, children's behavior becomes more strategically sophisticated with age on the first move. Beyond the age of 7 y, children begin to think about strategic interaction not myopically, but in a farsighted way, possibly with a view to cooperating and capitalizing on mutual gains in long-run relationships.practical reasoning | child development | game theory S trategic environments determine outcomes as a function of the decision of many players. Behavior in these environments is directed by a capacity we term strategic theory of mind (SToM), the capacity to infer other people's mental processes and predict their behavior on the basis of knowledge of their incentives and assumption of their rationality. SToM requires two more primitive capacities. The first is "ordinary" theory of mind (ToM), which is a person's ability to "impute mental states to himself and others" (1). The second is recursive thinking (RT), which is the ability to use the output of one step of a reasoning process as input to a following step. In addition, SToM requires that agents reason about the incentives of all involved.To take an example of the combination of ToM, RT, and reasoning about incentives that will be relevant in the context of this study, suppose that Ann and Bob play a game with rules known to both players, where the rules imply that Ann has an incentive to lie to Bob when Bob believes her. Ann can conclude that she should lie to Bob. Similarly, Bob can conclude that Ann has an incentive to lie to him, and hence he will not believe her. However, in the same manner, Ann concludes that Bob will perform exactly the same reasoning, so that Bob will be skeptical in view of Ann's incentive to lie. Ann will use this output of her reasoning about Bob's incentives as input for her next step of reasoning, and conclu...

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Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups

Cited by 407 publications

References 41 publications

Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and age — An experiment in Austria and Sweden

Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and age — An experiment in Austria and Sweden

Inconsistency and social decision making in patients with Borderline Personality Disorder

Children’s strategic theory of mind

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