Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis on Selection Behavior of Trans-Regional Hospitals and Patients in Telemedicine System

Gao, Yuxuan; Du, Yi; Sun, Baiqing; Wang, Rui; Jiang, Chaoying

doi:10.2991/ijcis.2017.10.1.75

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Ma (2015) explored complex and dynamic game relationship among participants in the forest insurance market based on a tripartite evolutionary game model. Gao (2017) applied evolutionary game theory to discuss and analyze selection behavior of trans-regional hospitals and patients in a telemedicine system. Yang (2019) constructed an evolutionary game model under incomplete information to research the role whistleblowing is playing in the air pollution control campaign in China.…”

Section: B Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2019

IRFC

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Section: B Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2019

IRFC

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Ma (2015) explored complex and dynamic game relationship among participants in the forest insurance market based on a tripartite evolutionary game model. Gao (2017) applied evolutionary game theory to discuss and analyze selection behavior of trans-regional hospitals and patients in a telemedicine system. constructed an evolutionary game model under incomplete information to research the role whistleblowing is playing in the air pollution control campaign in China.…”

Section: B Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

Shao¹

2019

IRFC

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The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper will analyze the costs and benefits of three parties (i.e. government, insurance companies and consumers) and their strategies regarding information disclosure of insurance products on the internet. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision not regulation that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information. The different current situations in China and Japan are discussed in light of the model, and some measures are suggested to promote the development of internet insurance markets in both countries.

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“…Instead, they will optimize their strategies constantly according to their interest goals and feedback information, such as imitation and learning. Therefore, it is applicable and reasonable to analyze the propagation and evolution process of public opinion and to find the key intervention point through evolutionary game theory [4][5]. In addition, considering the solvability of the game model, we propose a three-party evolutionary game model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Model of Public Opinion Information Propagation in Online Social Networks

Wang

2020

IEEE Access

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The rapid development of communication technology has greatly changed the way of information propagation. While making use of positive public opinion information in online social networks (OSN) to create value, it is necessary to manage and control the propagation of public opinion. Considering the existence of both positive and negative public opinion, we proposed a tripartite evolutionary game model through identifying the relevant stakeholders involved in the public opinion spreading process, discussed the equilibrium conditions of stakeholders' behavior strategies emphatically and carried out simulation experiments. Then, based on the experimental results, the management strategy and the key intervention points of public opinion spreading were proposed. The result shows that the key to management and control public opinion is realizing the interest balance of all stakeholders. That is, the government should increase the benefits of netizens and media spreading (reporting) positive public opinion, and at the same time strengthen the punishment of them spreading (reporting) negative public opinion. This paper further expands the research of public opinion propagation in OSN, and provides theoretical support and decision-making basis for the management and control of public opinion.

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis on Selection Behavior of Trans-Regional Hospitals and Patients in Telemedicine System

Cited by 12 publications

References 15 publications

Untitled

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How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

Evolutionary Game Model of Public Opinion Information Propagation in Online Social Networks

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