2016
DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1148412
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Transnistrian strategy in the context of Russian–Ukrainian relations: the rise and failure of ‘dual alignment’

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Cited by 12 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…During the Smirnov presidency, Transnistria announced its intention to enhance cooperation with Ukraine, including possibly joining this state. Moreover, the Transnistrian de facto state even expressed the intention to conduct multi-vector foreign policy or closely cooperate with the EU and the US, instead of Russia (Kosienkowski 2012, 19 and 27;Istomin and Bolgova 2016). While due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict Transnistria cannot court Ukraine any longer, the Transnistrian leadership can still exploit (trade) links with the EU, trying to influence Russia.…”
Section: Achieving Russia's Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the Smirnov presidency, Transnistria announced its intention to enhance cooperation with Ukraine, including possibly joining this state. Moreover, the Transnistrian de facto state even expressed the intention to conduct multi-vector foreign policy or closely cooperate with the EU and the US, instead of Russia (Kosienkowski 2012, 19 and 27;Istomin and Bolgova 2016). While due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict Transnistria cannot court Ukraine any longer, the Transnistrian leadership can still exploit (trade) links with the EU, trying to influence Russia.…”
Section: Achieving Russia's Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This distinction between regulated and unregulated trade is a critical one for the cases we examine, and beyond them. The so-called de-facto or unrecognized states that are one of the actors in these conflicts have frequently been associated with large-and small-scale smuggling as one of the principle economic lifelines of regimes that have otherwise few options of revenue generation, which has been documented for both the post-Soviet cases (e.g., Chamberlain-Creanga and Allin 2010;International Crisis Group 2006;Istomin and Bolgova 2016;Kolstø 2006) andelsewhere (e.g., Hafeez 2014;Mylonas and Ahram 2015;Rolandsen 2019). At the same time, efforts have been under way over the years to regulate these trade flows with a view to curb organized criminal activity and to engage with business elites as a potential peacebuilding constituency without threatening the economic survival of the entities in question (e.g., Axyonova et al 2018;Całus 2016b;Mirimanova 2006;Popescu and Litra 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%