Transgovernmental Networks and Nonproliferation

Abstract

Cold War-era international regimes to combat the proliferation of unconventional weapons face increasing doubts regarding their viability. These doubts mirror broader concerns about the efficacy of states and intergovernmental organizations in an era of globalization. Nonproliferation export controls-multilaterally coordinated national regulations on the cross-border transfers of technologies with weapons applications-present a test case for debates over the prospects for, and plausibility of, alternative models of global governance. If globalization theorists are correct in claiming that the efficacy of states has been significantly eroded, then national export controls and multilateral export control coordination should be increasingly ineffective. If, as more skeptical voices maintain, globalization presents little threat to the authority and effectiveness of states, then this should be evident in the export control field. A third perspective-transgovernmentalism-argues that while globalization presents significant challenges to states, they are increasingly and successfully addressing these challenges through the formation of government networks. Evidence from the issuearea of nonproliferation export control supports the transgovernmentalist perspective.

The effect of expert recommendations on intergovernmental decision-making: North Korea, Iran, and non-proliferation sanctions in the Security Council

“…The three networks issue export trigger lists that member states should implement to prevent undesirable proliferation. 76 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1974 as a transgovernmental network of national regulators of currently 48 states, including all five permanent Council members. 77 The NSG elaborates and regularly updates two export trigger lists comprised of 'items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use' 78 (so-called NSG Guidelines Part 1) and 'nuclear related dual-use items and technologies' (so-called NSG Guidelines Part 2).…”

“…7 The rationalist literature on transgovernmental networks, as in non-proliferation export control, studies their function as global governance entities. 8 Yet, such concepts often treat expertise as dependent variables and pay less attention to whether expertise affects state bargaining. Fang and Stone 9 study how IOs may persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations based on private information when their interests conflict, but this does not explain whether expertise may affect decision-making among governments with strong vested interests.…”

Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation

“…Scholars examined direct links among lower‐level government bureaucrats in areas such as economic and monetary policy (Russell ), food policy (Hopkins ; Hopkins & Puchala ), energy policy (Keohane ), and the specific case of US–Canada relations (Holsti & Levy ). More recently, scholars have identified such networks in policy domains as diverse as aircraft certification (Bermann ), pharmaceuticals (Bach & Newman 2010a), competition policy (Djelic & Kleiner ), data privacy (Newman ), human rights (Cardenas ), nonproliferation (Lipson ), and the environment (Raustiala ). The literature uses the term “network” because it captures the informal, non‐treaty‐based nature of cooperation, which places the lion's share of work in the hands of members organized in committees, rather than in a large centralized bureaucracy.…”

“…See, for example, Bermann (), Raustiala (), Cardenas (), Slaughter (), Lipson (), Damro (), Singer (), Eberlein and Newman (), Newman (), Thurner and Martin (), Bach (), and Bach and Newman (2010a). …”