Transgovernmental Networks and Cooperation in the Global South

Abstract

Why do bureaucrats from developing countries cooperate internationally? I argue that international inter-agency cooperation in the Global South results from the need of expert bureaucrats to invest in skill formation when governments do not. When states cut funding, expert bureaucrats cooperate with foreign peers to upgrade their skillsets because career advancement is contingent on up-to-date expertise. To test my theory, I use cross-national co-sponsorship data of projects in nuclear energy, science and technology (NEST) for 69 countries . Results show that bureaucrats cooperate internationally when government spending decreases and that cooperation is more likely to occur among bureaucrats with higher initial skill levels and similar levels of professional development (i.e. homophily). These findings carry implications for the study of global governance in the developing world.

Transgovernmental Network Governance and the Co-Competition of Asian Space Governance

“…I. Alcaniz [2016] narrowed the focus to transgovernmental networks and cooperation among the Global South within the discourse of international politics. In specific issue areas, M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink [1999] explored routes through which non-state actors influence international politics, outlining the concept of transgovernmental advocacy networks within civil society.…”

Regulators without borders? Latin American labour inspectors in transnational context

“…In fact, Slaughter and Zaring go so far as to assert that networks exert an 'inertial pull' (Slaughter and Zaring 2006: 215) on potential participants, and in so doing ignore both the possibility -and in some cases persistence -of multiple networks in the same issue area (Levi-Faur 2010: 14;Raustiala 2002: 67) and the broader puzzle of non-membership. 'Contrary to images of flat networks with universal participation', explain David Bach and Abraham Newman, 'membership systematically varies and thus should affect the types of global governance conducted' (Bach and Newman 2009: 4-5; see also Alcañiz 2016;Etzioni 2002;Faul 2016;Legrand 2015). While larger, more heterogeneous groups have more trouble forging binding agreements, smaller, more homogeneous groups have more trouble making the case for their legitimacy, and transnational networks are therefore no less vulnerable to the well-known 'tension between legitimacy and efficacy' (Kupchan 2012: 196) than traditional international organizations (Alvarez 2001;Cottarelli 2005;Downs et al 1998;Etzioni 2004;Kahler 2009;Woods 1999).…”