Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism

Henderson, David; Horgan, Terry; Potrč, Matjaž

doi:10.1007/s12136-007-0015-8

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Transglobal reliabilism is another ingenious alternative. See (Henderson and Horgan 2006) and (Henderson et al 2007). Burge provides a transcendental argument for the conclusion that normal environments are privileged in assessing entitlement where the key step in the argument is that such contexts help to determine the nature of the content of the mental states such as belief (Burge 2003, 533-7).…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement

Janvid

2009

Acta Anal

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The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently clarified, accomplishing these results is easier said than done -especially if we also want to ascribe positive epistemic value to entitlement. It will be shown that the epistemic value of entitlement is either granted at the expense of the epistemic value of justification or the value ends up below the level of value at which the epistemologists employing the concept of entitlement are aiming.Keywords Epistemic value . Entitlement . Externalism . Internalism . Burge . Dretske IThe current discussion of epistemic value focuses on the epistemic value of knowledge. However, the epistemic value of other lesser epistemic states, some of which are constituents of knowledge, is also interesting to investigate. Insofar as an epistemic state is a constituent of knowledge, we would thereby account for its contribution to the epistemic value of knowledge.

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Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement

Janvid

2009

Acta Anal

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“…11 An overall methodological approach about how to reconcile the often forthcoming opposed views (proceeding from exclusive disjunction) affirms inclusive disjunction (Potr forthcoming a, forthcoming b). For the area of epistemology, the inclusive disjunction approach proposes evidentalist reliabilism (Henderson, Horgan and Potr 2007). Intuitionist particularism (Potr , forthcoming c) includes both generalities and particular patterns in an overall approach.…”

Section: Cognitivist Expressivism As a Neo-meinongian Positionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meinongian Theory of Moral Judgments

Potrč¹

2009

Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy

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Meinong held it that there exist genuine ought-beliefs underpinning moral judgment. A neo-Meinongian theory of moral judgment based upon oughtbeliefs is presented first. Moral judgments are held to be genuine beliefs possessing constitutive moral phenomenology. The phenomenology of intentionality thesis underlies this approach. It is thereby opposed to treating intentionality and phenomenology in a separate manner. The very possibility of oughtbeliefs as a special kind conflicts with beliefs' restriction to their just descriptive role. This allows for an interesting metaethical combination of cognitivism and expressivism. Meinongian ought-beliefs come naturally as a separate kind in the Brentanian sequence of psychological phenomena.

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“…Our emphasis here on evidence, and on one's standards of evidential support, is not at odds with epistemological positions such as process reliabilism about epistemic justification. For, a process reliabilist can construe evidence for p as-roughly, and ignoring important complications about total evidence-available information which, if fed into a reliable belief-forming process, would generate a belief that p. For discussion and elaboration see Henderson, Horgan, and Potrč (2007) and Section 7.3 of Henderson and Horgan (2011). 13…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Second, transglobal reliability is itself so tightly intertwined conceptually with objective epistemic rationality-i.e., with likely truth, given one's available evidence-that the two cannot come apart. See Horgan and Henderson (2001, 2006, 2011 Chapters 3-5 and Section 7.1), Henderson, Horgan, and Potrč (2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality

Henderson

Horgan²,

Potrč

et al. 2017

Grazer Philosophische Studien

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The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal hierarchy that the authors claim is inherent to the structure of epistemically responsible belief-formation: pursuing true beliefs by pursuing beliefs that are objectively likely given one’s total available evidence; pursuing this sub-goal by pursuing beliefs that are likely true (given that evidence) relative to one’s own deep epistemic sensibility; and pursuing this sub-sub-goal by forming beliefs in accordance with one’s own all-in, ultima facie, epistemic seemings.

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Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism

Cited by 12 publications

References 10 publications

The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement

The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement

Meinongian Theory of Moral Judgments

Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality

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