2017
DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000015
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Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality

Abstract: The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nest… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
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“…9 The discussion of peer disagreement and testimony in philosophy deserves much more space than can be afforded here. Readers worried that my point about peer disagreement is self-defeating should see (Everett, 2014;Henderson et al, 2017;Kornblith, 2013;van Inwagen, 2010) for a sampling of the different ways around the challenge of peer disagreement in philosophy.…”
Section: Philosophical Progress Without Testimonymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…9 The discussion of peer disagreement and testimony in philosophy deserves much more space than can be afforded here. Readers worried that my point about peer disagreement is self-defeating should see (Everett, 2014;Henderson et al, 2017;Kornblith, 2013;van Inwagen, 2010) for a sampling of the different ways around the challenge of peer disagreement in philosophy.…”
Section: Philosophical Progress Without Testimonymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Odziv, ki ga bomo zagovarjali, se v veliki meri opira na izkustvene razlike med primeri preprostega seštevanja ter primeri filozofskih, verskih ali pa političnih prepričanj. Da bi to razliko lahko vzpostavili, si lahko pomagamo z razlikovanjem med globalnim in lokalnim spoznavnim vrstnikom (Henderson et al 2017). Pri obeh vrstah nestrinjanja drugega razumemo kot globalnega spoznavnega vrstnika -torej kot približno enako razumnega, za dokazila občutljivega, natančnega ipd.…”
Section: Etika Prepričanja In Problem Nestrinjanjaunclassified
“…His arguments can be applied to a recent topic of whether one should trust in peer reviewers when they made their counterarguments against our encouragement in our well-built arguments. For example, a recent article from Henderson, Horgan, Potrč, and Tierney argues for a possibility of retaining confirmation of belief in a proposition against peerhood by means of epistemic phenomenology (Henderson, Horgan, Potrč, and Tierney, 2017). Additionally, Lampert and Biro argue that Richard Feldman's principle of hyper-evidence from reviewers is just wrong and cannot be counted as truly impartial between two sides of an argument (Lampert and Biro, 2017).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%