Transforming functional requirements and risk information into models for analysis and simulation

Malin, Jane T.; Throop, David R.; Fleming, Land; Flores, Luis

doi:10.1109/aero.2005.1559729

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Each design has its own module that potentially could result in interactive hazards after assembly. Malin et al ( 26 ) suggest a method for finding the path of the vulnerability pair to identify the cross‐subsystem interaction risks based on the component connection model, which describes the input/output flow propagation within the physical equipment components.…”

Section: Interaction Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extended GTST‐MLD for Aerospace System Safety Analysis

2011

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The hazards caused by complex interactions in the aerospace system have become a problem that urgently needs to be settled. This article introduces a method for aerospace system hazard interaction identification based on extended GTST-MLD (goal tree-success tree-master logic diagram) during the design stage. GTST-MLD is a functional modeling framework with a simple architecture. Ontology is used to extend the ability of system interaction description in GTST-MLD by adding the system design knowledge and the past accident experience. From the level of functionality and equipment, respectively, this approach can help the technician detect potential hazard interactions. Finally, a case is used to show the method.

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Section: Interaction Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, the equipment connection model is constructed from the extended GTST‐MLD, and then the connection relationship can be defined by referring to the work. ( 26,30 ) Based on the GTST‐MLD model in Fig. 2 and the equipment connection attribute, a connection model for the unmanned spacecraft in Fig.…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended GTST‐MLD for Aerospace System Safety Analysis

2011

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Knowledge representation standards and interchange formats for causal graphs

Throop

Malin

Fleming³

2005

2005 IEEE Aerospace Conference

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Abstract12 -In many domains, automated reasoning tools must represent graphs of causally linked events. These include fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), planning, procedures, medical reasoning about disease progression, and functional architectures. Each of these fields has its own requirements for the representation of causation, events, actors and conditions. The representations include ontologies of function and cause, data dictionaries for causal dependency, failure and hazard, and interchange formats between some existing tools. In none of the domains has a generally accepted interchange format emerged. The paper makes progress towards interoperability across the wide range of causal analysis methodologies. We survey existing practice and emerging interchange formats in each of these fields. Setting forth a set of terms and concepts that are broadly shared across the domains, we examine the several ways in which current practice represents them. Some phenomena are difficult to represent or to analyze in several domains. These include mode transitions, reachability analysis, positive and negative feedback loops, conditions correlated but not causally linked and bimodal probability distributions. We work through examples and contrast the differing methods for addressing them. We detail recent work in knowledge interchange formats for causal trees in aerospace analysis applications in early design, safety and reliability. Several examples are discussed, with a particular focus on reachability analysis and mode transitions. We generalize the aerospace analysis work across the several other domains. We also recommend features and capabilities for the next generation of causal knowledge representation standards.

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Vulnerabilities, Influences and Interaction Paths: Failure Data for Integrated System Risk Analysis

Malin

Fleming

2006 IEEE Aerospace Conference

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Transforming functional requirements and risk information into models for analysis and simulation

Cited by 4 publications

References 5 publications

Extended GTST‐MLD for Aerospace System Safety Analysis

Extended GTST‐MLD for Aerospace System Safety Analysis

Knowledge representation standards and interchange formats for causal graphs

Vulnerabilities, Influences and Interaction Paths: Failure Data for Integrated System Risk Analysis

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