Transduction Shield: A Low-Complexity Method to Detect and Correct the Effects of EMI Injection Attacks on Sensors

Tu, Yazhou; Tida, Vijay Srinivas; Pan, Zhongqi; Hei, Xiali

doi:10.1145/3433210.3453097

Cited by 18 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In this CPT, photoresistors are placed under the tracks as sensors, detecting a train by the shadow it casts on the photoresistors. This method of detection is compact and inexpensive and was strategically chosen to allow the demonstration of an analogue attack on sensors (transduction attack) [ 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 ].…”

Section: Proposed Cptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and Education

Hosseinzadeh,

Voutos,

Barrie

et al. 2024

Sensors

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Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are vital in automating complex tasks across various sectors, yet they face significant vulnerabilities due to the rising threats of cybersecurity attacks. The recent surge in cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure (CI) and industrial control systems (ICSs), with a 150% increase in 2022 affecting over 150 industrial operations, underscores the urgent need for advanced cybersecurity strategies and education. To meet this requirement, we develop a specialised cyber-physical testbed (CPT) tailored for transportation CI, featuring a simplified yet effective automated level-crossing system. This hybrid CPT serves as a cost-effective, high-fidelity, and safe platform to facilitate cybersecurity education and research. High-fidelity networking and low-cost development are achieved by emulating the essential ICS components using single-board computers (SBC) and open-source solutions. The physical implementation of an automated level-crossing visualised the tangible consequences on real-world systems while emphasising their potential impact. The meticulous selection of sensors enhances the CPT, allowing for the demonstration of analogue transduction attacks on this physical implementation. Incorporating wireless access points into the CPT facilitates multi-user engagement and an infrared remote control streamlines the reinitialization effort and time after an attack. The SBCs overwhelm as traffic surges to 12 Mbps, demonstrating the consequences of denial-of-service attacks. Overall, the design offers a cost-effective, open-source, and modular solution that is simple to maintain, provides ample challenges for users, and supports future expansion.

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Section: Proposed Cptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and Education

Hosseinzadeh,

Voutos,

Barrie

et al. 2024

Sensors

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“…• Duplicate sensors will increase the size of the device by twice the size of the sensor. • cost of the device can become expensive • Attacker surface is increased as new sensors are added [106], [108] Sensor Modulation…”

Section: Strengthmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on security issues in modern Implantable Devices: Solutions and future issues

Kwarteng

Cebe

2022

Smart Health

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“…They are fully or partially integrated into modern RVs to assist them for planning and control. Spoofing attacks on other sensors, such as temperature sensor [83], pressure sensor [84], [85] and magnetic sensor [86], [87], are beyond the scope of this paper. Attacks against other cyber-physical systems (e.g., smart-home speakers [88], medical devices [89]) are not studied either.…”

Section: Systematization Scopementioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Rethinking Sensor Spoofing Attacks against Robotic Vehicles from a Systematic View

Xu¹,

Han²,

Deng³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Robotic Vehicles (RVs) have gained great popularity over the past few years. Meanwhile, they are also demonstrated to be vulnerable to sensor spoofing attacks. Although a wealth of research works have presented various attacks, some key questions remain unanswered: are these existing works complete enough to cover all the sensor spoofing threats? If not, how many attacks are not explored, and how difficult is it to realize them?This paper answers the above questions by comprehensively systematizing the knowledge of sensor spoofing attacks against RVs. Our contributions are threefold. (1) We identify seven common attack paths in an RV system pipeline. We categorize and assess existing spoofing attacks from the perspectives of spoofer property, operation, victim characteristic and attack goal. Based on this systematization, we identify 4 interesting insights about spoofing attack designs. (2) We propose a novel action flow model to systematically describe robotic function executions and sensor spoofing vulnerabilities. With this model, we successfully discover 104 spoofing attack vectors, 25 of which have been verified by prior works, while 55 attacks are practical but never considered. (3) We design two novel attack methodologies to verify the feasibility of newly discovered spoofing attack vectors.

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Transduction Shield: A Low-Complexity Method to Detect and Correct the Effects of EMI Injection Attacks on Sensors

Cited by 18 publications

References 29 publications

Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and Education

Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and Education

A survey on security issues in modern Implantable Devices: Solutions and future issues

SoK: Rethinking Sensor Spoofing Attacks against Robotic Vehicles from a Systematic View

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