Transcendental philosophy and the problem of necessity in a contingent world

Jansen, Julia

doi:10.19079/metodo.s1.1.47

Cited by 31 publications

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“…Kant thinks of a necessary unity as a unity that receives its necessity “top–down” from the “highest point” of reason […]. Husserl, on the contrary, thinks of unity “laterally,” as a unity of “coincidence ( Deckung ),” which enables a priori insight not only into necessities that “reason itself produces according to its own plan” (B xiii), as Kant famously claimed, but also into necessities reason genuinely discovers ( Jansen, 2015 , pp. 48–49, emphases in original).…”

Section: The Transcendentalist Challenge and Varieties Of Transcendenmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Living Transcendental — An Integrationist View of Naturalized Phenomenology

Netland

2020

Front. Psychol.

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In this article I take on the "Transcendentalist Challenge" to naturalized phenomenology, highlighting how the ontological and methodological commitments of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy point in the direction of an integration of the transcendental and the scientific, thus making room for a productive exchange between philosophy and psychological science when it comes to understanding consciousness and its place in nature. Discussing various conceptions of naturalized phenomenology, I argue that what I call an "Integrationist View" is required if we are to make sense of the possibility of productive exchange between phenomenology and the sciences. My main argument is that if we conceive of consciousness as a structure of behavior ontologically prior to the distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity and third-and first-person perspectives, we arrive at a view of the transcendental as not essentially separate from the domain of science, but rather as contingent organizational norms of empirical nature that are best illuminated through a dialectical exchange between phenomenological and scientific approaches. I end by showing how Merleau-Ponty's engagement with the "Schneider case" in an example of such an integration.

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Section: The Transcendentalist Challenge and Varieties Of Transcendenmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Living Transcendental — An Integrationist View of Naturalized Phenomenology

Netland

2020

Front. Psychol.

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“…21. For more on Husserl’s work on bodily movement, see: Carman (1999) and Bower (2014). For more on perceptual normativity, see: Crowell (2013), Jansen (2015), and Doyon (2015). For more on passive familiarity and personality, see: Moran (2011, 2014) and Lohmar (2003, 2014).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Mazijk

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.

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“…Jansen (2015) provides a detailed discussion of Husserl's account of the necessary order of what appears in contrast to Kant.…”

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confidence: 99%

Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty on the World of Experience

Jacobs

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the world differ, despite other significant commonalities. Specifically, it discusses how both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of our experience of the world challenge Husserl’s assertion of the possibility of a worldless consciousness; how Heidegger’s discussion of the world entails a rejection of Husserl’s claim that the world is at bottom nature; and how Merleau-Ponty puts pressure on Husserl’s account of the necessary structure of the world. In concluding, and as a propaedeutic to adjudicating these disputes, this chapter aims to show why Husserl makes these contested claims. Specifically, it suggests that it is Husserl’s phenomenological conception of reason and his commitment to (this conception of) reason that motivate him to make the claims about our experience and world with which the later phenomenologists take issue.

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Transcendental philosophy and the problem of necessity in a contingent world

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

The Living Transcendental — An Integrationist View of Naturalized Phenomenology

The Living Transcendental — An Integrationist View of Naturalized Phenomenology

Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty on the World of Experience

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