Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing

Haji, Anouar El; Onderstal, Sander

doi:10.1111/jems.12314

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…In a situation of competitive acquisition, we can expect that people near the head of the line will defend their position against intruders with more vigor than the ones near the end, and that is actually the case . In situations of cooperative trade, when people sell their place in line, we can expect that places near the head of the queue will command a higher price than those at the tail, and that is actually the case (El Haji & Onderstal, 2019;Humphrey, 1991;Zhou & Soman, 2008). Again, one might say that cooperative trade re-creates some information that was already available from competitive interaction, but parsimony would suggest otherwise.…”

Section: R44 Is Cooperation Sufficient?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Boyer

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers”, “that is not mine”. This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.

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Section: R44 Is Cooperation Sufficient?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Boyer

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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“…In a situation of competitive acquisition, we can expect that people near the head of the line will defend their position against intruders with more vigor than the ones near the end, and that is actually the case (Fagundes, 2017; Mann, 1969). In situations of cooperative trade, when people sell their place in line, we can expect that places near the head of the queue will command a higher price than those at the tail, and that is actually the case (El Haji & Onderstal, 2019; Humphrey, 1991; Zhou & Soman, 2008). Again, one might say that cooperative trade re-creates some information that was already available from competitive interaction, but parsimony would suggest otherwise.…”

Section: Cooperation: the Construction Of L() Tagsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences

Boyer

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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Commentators discussed the coherence and validity of a minimalist approach to ownership intuitions, in ways that make it possible to clarify the model, re-evaluate its cognitive underpinnings, and sketch some of its implications. This response summarizes the model; addresses issues concerning the need for a special technical lexicon when describing cognitive semantics; the psychology involved in contexts of competitive acquisition and their consequences for possession and use of rival resources; the role of cooperative expectations in creating mutually beneficial allocation of resources; the consequences of ownership psychology for social interaction and the production of social norms of property; and the relations between psychological processes and legal institutions in the domain, before proposing some final thoughts.

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Auctions for Trading Queueing Positions

Cui

Wang

Yang

2023

SpringerBriefs in Service Science

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The first-in, first-out (FIFO) queue discipline respects the order of arrivals but is not efficient when customers have heterogeneous waiting costs. Priority queues, in which customers with higher waiting costs are served first, are more efficient but usually involve undesirable queue-jumping behaviors that violate bumped customers’ property rights over their waiting spots. To have the best of both worlds, this chapter introduces time trading mechanisms, in which customers who are privately informed about their waiting costs mutually agree on the ordering in the queue by trading positions. If a customer ever moves back in the queue, she will receive an appropriate monetary compensation. Customers can always decide not to participate in trading and retain their positions as if they are being served FIFO. We design the optimal mechanisms for the social planner, the service provider, and an intermediary who might mediate the trading platform. Both the social planner’s and the service provider’s optimal mechanisms involve a flat admission fee and an auction that implements strict priority. If a revenue-maximizing intermediary operates the trading platform, it should charge a trade participation fee and implement an auction with some trade restrictions. Therefore, customers are not strictly prioritized. However, relative to a FIFO system, the intermediary delivers value to the social planner by improving efficiency, and to the service provider by increasing its revenue. This chapter is primarily based on Yang et al. (Manag Sci 63(7):2377–2395, 2017) where interested readers can find proofs of the results shown in this chapter.

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Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing

Cited by 5 publications

References 57 publications

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences

Auctions for Trading Queueing Positions

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