Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model

Abstract

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers”, “that is not mine”. This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.

On intuitive versus institutional accounts of ownership

“…Central to the model of ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation is about general respect of ownership as a of cooperation expectations (Boyer, 2022). Boyer suggests that ownership derived from the interaction of two cognitive systems, one that handles competition for resources and another that handles anticipated cooperation.…”

“…Decades of human behavioral research has documented that the psychological self extends to the ideas of one's mind, the parts of one's body, and the physical possessions and locations associated with one's body Sommer, 2002). The "implicit rules of ownership" referenced by Boyer (2022) very much follow the implicit rules for possessing one's own body parts. An everyday example is road rage, where perceived infractions of an automobile's intentions are treated as direct bodily violations.…”

“…Boyer's framework for ownership proposes a unidirectional flow from inputs to outputs (Boyer, 2022), thus ignoring two critical features of humans as embodied agents. Our first point is that the specific capabilities of a body influence the inputs to the system.…”

How the minimalist model of ownership psychology can aid in explaining moral behaviors under resource constraints

“…Central to the model of ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation is the assumption about general respect of ownership as a consequence of cooperation expectations (Boyer, 2022). Boyer suggests that ownership is derived from the interaction of two cognitive systems, one that handles competition for resources and another that handles anticipated cooperation.…”

“…These systems are argued to account for the flexibility of people's intuitions about ownership. This flexibility in turn allows criminal agents not to be inconsistent in their ownership intuitions, but simply to not include their unethical behavior “in the range of cooperation intuitions” (Boyer, 2022, p. 32). As Boyer argues: “It is a familiar observation that most criminals think in terms of Us vs.…”