Trading partner choice and bargaining culture in negotiations

Phillips, Owen R.; Nagler, Amy M.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Huang, Shanshan; Bastian, Christopher T.

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.005

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Individual buyers and sellers could trade up to a maximum of eight units during a trading period. Random matching of buyers and sellers during each bargaining round, with no other allowed communications except trading information during the experiment, averted the influence of reputation building and partner choosing (Phillips et al, 2014). Additionally, units traded, trade prices, and payoffs were not made public to be consistent with the private negotiation institution.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

Rahman

Bastian

Ritten

et al. 2019

J. Agric. Appl. Econ.

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We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

Rahman

Bastian

Ritten

et al. 2019

J. Agric. Appl. Econ.

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“…We follow the method used by previous studies with similar comparisons of experimental data (Phillips et al. 2014; Rahman et al. 2019).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and Trustworthiness of Christians, Muslims, and Atheists/Agnostics in the United States

Thunström

Ritten

Bastian

et al. 2021

Scientific Study of Religion

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Trust, a cornerstone of economic development, is promoted within religions. In a randomized controlled trial, we examine how trust and trustworthiness vary across religions (Christianity and Islam), religiosity, and atheists/agnostics in the United States. Three novel findings emerge. First, Christians are trusted more than Muslims and nonbelievers, which is due to a Christian ingroup bias––Christians trust Christians more than they trust Muslims and nonbelievers, while Muslims and nonbelievers trust all groups the same. Second, religiosity matters to trust. Religious people trust those of higher religiosity more, but only if they are of the same religion. In contrast, nonbelievers trust people of higher religiosity less. Third, trustworthiness among nonbelievers is somewhat lower than that of the religious, especially toward Christians. We speculate that the lower reciprocity originates in the prejudice toward nonbelievers. Our results may help explain discrimination against Muslims and nonbelievers, given that discrimination often originates in distrust.

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“… ii Units Produced do not meet normality and are severely skewed as per Brown [ 49 ]. Thus, following previous research, we report averages for the last 5 trading periods per treatment and non-parametric test results [ 30 , 31 , 50 ]. All other variables meet the normality assumption and the convergence results and parametric tests are reported using data from all 20 trading periods.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To lend validity to the convergence analysis, results are compared to two-tailed Wilcoxon’s non-parametric Rank-Sum tests and regression analyses over the last five periods (which is used in the previous literature to represent convergence [ 30 , 31 , 50 ]) when including covariates found to potentially influence market outcomes from previous literature ( S2 Text ). Although including covariates when measuring treatment effect leads to biased estimators [ 51 ], recent literature suggests that properly adjusting for any imbalanced prognostic variables is appropriate [ 52 , 53 ].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets

2021

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Despite recent emphasis and implementation of national and international anti-money laundering policies, illegal product markets, and their associated illicit profit remain a global problem. In addition to law enforcement aimed at reducing money-laundering, enforcement also takes place during (1) the production (e.g. crop eradication) and (2) sale (e.g. seizure of products during transportation that interrupts buyer and seller transactions) of the illegal product. Since funds for enforcement come from limited budgets, understanding where in this production-trade-laundering cycle law enforcement is most impactful becomes a global question. Using laboratory experimental markets and a seizure rate of 20%, we find that law enforcement focused on seizing laundered profits does little to reduce illegal market activity when compared to no law enforcement, suggesting that focusing law enforcement on money laundering will likely be ineffective at reducing crime. Results further show the amount of illicit trade is nearly 32% lower when law enforcement is focused at the point of sale, and there may be additional economic incentives that reduce illicit trade in the long run when compared to no law enforcement. Enforcement at the point of production also reduces market activity, but not as effectively as enforcement at the point of sale. Lastly, the empirical findings deviate from equilibrium predictions, suggesting law enforcement policy based on theory alone may lead to inefficient allocation of limited law enforcement resources.

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Trading partner choice and bargaining culture in negotiations

Cited by 5 publications

References 14 publications

Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

Trust and Trustworthiness of Christians, Muslims, and Atheists/Agnostics in the United States

The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets

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