No abstract

While the demand for pollination services have been increasing, continued declines in honey bee, Apis mellifera L. (Hymenoptera: Apidae), colonies have put the cropping sector and the broader health of agro-ecosystems at risk. Economic factors may play a role in dwindling honey bee colony supply in the United States, but have not been extensively studied. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), we measure technical efficiency, returns to scale, and factors influencing the efficiency of those apiaries in the northern Rocky Mountain region participating in the pollination services market. We find that, although over 25% of apiaries are technically efficient, many experience either increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Smaller apiaries (under 80 colonies) experience increasing returns to scale, but a lack of available financing may hinder them from achieving economically sustainable colony levels. Larger apiaries (over 1,000 colonies) experience decreasing returns to scale. Those beekeepers may have economic incentivizes to decrease colony numbers. Using a double bootstrap method, we find that apiary location and off-farm employment influence apiary technical efficiency. Apiaries in Wyoming are found to be more efficient than those in Utah or Montana. Further, engagement in off-farm employment increases an apiary's technical efficiency. The combined effects of efficiency gains through off-farm employment and diseconomies of scale may explain, in part, the historical decline in honey bee numbers.

We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

Trust, a cornerstone of economic development, is promoted within religions. In a randomized controlled trial, we examine how trust and trustworthiness vary across religions (Christianity and Islam), religiosity, and atheists/agnostics in the United States. Three novel findings emerge. First, Christians are trusted more than Muslims and nonbelievers, which is due to a Christian ingroup bias––Christians trust Christians more than they trust Muslims and nonbelievers, while Muslims and nonbelievers trust all groups the same. Second, religiosity matters to trust. Religious people trust those of higher religiosity more, but only if they are of the same religion. In contrast, nonbelievers trust people of higher religiosity less. Third, trustworthiness among nonbelievers is somewhat lower than that of the religious, especially toward Christians. We speculate that the lower reciprocity originates in the prejudice toward nonbelievers. Our results may help explain discrimination against Muslims and nonbelievers, given that discrimination often originates in distrust.