2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3230767
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Trading Networks With General Preferences

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 43 publications
(94 reference statements)
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“…Note, however, that stable and chain-stable outcomes are generally not trail-stable without FS.27 In Example 4, we showed that there are no stable outcomes in Example 2. Similar logic shows that there are no chain-stable outcomes in that example either.28 Subsequent to our work,Schlegel (2019) established results on the lattice structure of the set of competitive equilibria.…”
supporting
confidence: 61%
“…Note, however, that stable and chain-stable outcomes are generally not trail-stable without FS.27 In Example 4, we showed that there are no stable outcomes in Example 2. Similar logic shows that there are no chain-stable outcomes in that example either.28 Subsequent to our work,Schlegel (2019) established results on the lattice structure of the set of competitive equilibria.…”
supporting
confidence: 61%
“…The lattice property of competitive equilibrium payoffs and prices is intensively investigated in various directions, like matching models, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1971), Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) The rural hospital theorem of stable matchings and competitive equilibria has been established in different models, like matching models, e.g., Roth (1986), Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), and Kojima et al (2018), and models of trading networks, e.g., Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Fleiner et al (2018), and Schlegel (2019). It shows the invariance of the sets of matched agents in different stable matchings and competitive equilibria.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The lattice property of competitive equilibrium payoffs and prices is intensively investigated in various directions, like matching models, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1971), Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) The rural hospital theorem of stable matchings and competitive equilibria has been established in different models, like matching models, e.g., Roth (1986), Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), and Kojima et al (2018), and models of trading networks, e.g., Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Fleiner et al (2018), and Schlegel (2019). It shows the invariance of the sets of matched agents in different stable matchings and competitive equilibria.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%