Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints

Abstract

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Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints

“…We further show the equivalence between QCCE outcomes and expectational equilibrium outcomes. Together with the equivalence results in Herings and Zhou (2021), this demonstrates the coincidence of QCCE outcomes, expectational equilibrium outcomes, stable outcomes and core outcomes in our model. The limit results related to stable outcomes and core outcomes now follow as corollaries.…”

“…The sets of "strongly stable outcomes,""strict core outcomes,"and competitive equilibrium outcomes coincide in an economy with soft liquidity constraints (Crawford and Knoer, 1981). 6 However, in an economy with hard liquidity constraints, the sets of strongly stable outcomes and strict core outcomes can be empty (Herings and Zhou, 2021). Thus, a convergent sequence of competitive equilibrium outcomes, strongly stable outcomes, or strict core outcomes in economies with increasingly stringent soft liquidity constraints may not be a competitive equilibrium outcome, strongly stable outcome or strict core outcome at the limit economy with hard liquidity constraints, respectively.…”

“…A competitive equilibrium always exists in the case of soft liquidity constraints, but may fail to do so in the presence of hard liquidity constraints. Herings and Zhou (2021) argue that the standard notion of competitive equilibrium is not appropriate and introduce a quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium (QCCE). A QCCE extends a standard competitive equilibrium by introducing endogenously determined expectations of buyers about the availability of trades.…”

“…In one-to-one matching models with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes, Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2019) de…ne the notion of aggregate equilibrium. In one-to-one matching models with hard liquidity constraints, Herings and Zhou (2021) propose the notion of a QCCE. They study the formation of QCCEs in decentralized markets and the structural properties of QCCEs.…”

A piaci likviditás és a szabályozás kapcsolatának vizsgálata általános egyensúlyelméleti modellkeretben

“…Csóka és szerzőtársai[2007],Herings-Zhou [2019], Eisfeldt[2004],Kőhegyi-Stépán [2003] és Zalai[1998]. ezek a tanulmányok a felírt modell megoldásához nyújtanak segítséget.…”