Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditures: Empirical Explorations Using New SIPRI-Data

Pamp, Oliver; Thurner, Paul W.

doi:10.1080/10242694.2016.1277452

Cited by 26 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…This complements the use of log military expenditures ( L o g m i l e x ), which are measured in millions of 2010 constant US dollars. One may suspect that arms imports and military spending are part of an accounting identity, but results by Pamp & Thurner (2017) clearly show that this is not the case. We also include the log of arms exports ( L o g e x p o r t ).…”

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…While technically relying on a similar exclusion restriction compared to an instrumental variable approach, both the import and the export equation are predominantly theoretically justified. For the import equation, we use insights from Smith & Tasiran (2005), who estimate demand functions for arms imports, as well as results from Pamp & Thurner (2017) who analyze the relationship between arms and military expenditures. The second-stage import equation is thus as follows:…”

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The build-up of coercive capacities

Pamp

Rudolph

Thurner

et al. 2018

Journal of Peace Research

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Do governments’ military build-ups foster the outbreak of intrastate violence? This article investigates the impact of governments’ arms imports on the onset of intrastate conflicts. There is scant empirical research on the role of the external acquisition of coercive technologies, and even fewer studies explore the respective causal mechanisms of their consequences. We argue that the existing literature has not adequately considered the potential simultaneity between conflict initiation and arms purchases. In contrast, our study explicitly takes into account that weapon inflows may not only causally induce conflicts but may themselves be caused by conflict anticipation. Following a review of applicable theoretical models to derive our empirical expectations, we offer two innovative approaches to surmount this serious endogeneity problem. First, we employ a simultaneous equations model that allows us to estimate the concurrent effects of both arms imports on conflict onsets and conflict onsets on imports. Second, we are the first to use an instrumental variable approach that uses the import of weapon types not suitable for intrastate conflict as instruments for weapon imports that are relevant for fighting in civil wars. Relying on arms transfer data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for the period 1949-2013, we provide estimates for the effect of imports on civil war onset. Our empirical results clearly show that while arms imports are not a genuine cause of intrastate conflicts, they significantly increase the probability of an onset in countries where conditions are notoriously conducive to conflict. In such situations, arms are not an effective deterrent but rather spark conflict escalation.

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Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Data and Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

The build-up of coercive capacities

Pamp

Rudolph

Thurner

et al. 2018

Journal of Peace Research

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The economic analysis of the arms trade has primarily focused on new trade theory, industrial organization, and regulation theory, with the addition of security concerns and (home biased) procurement to examine how export and industrial policies affect national security, the defense industry as well as the consequences for importer countries (García-Alonso and Levine 2007). It is true that arms trade is very specific due to different strategic interests and security aspects affecting it (Pamp and Thurner 2017), but it is still surprising that such an element has been absent from the debate about the link between economic growth and foreign trade.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Empirical Analysis of Arms Exports and Economic Growth Spillovers: The Case of the United States

Callado-Muñoz

Hromcová

Herrero

et al. 2022

Defence and Peace Economics

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In this paper we study closely the relationship between arms exports, labor productivity and economic growth. Using a connectedness-measurement technology fundamentally grounded in modern network theory, we determine the size and direction of the spillover effects between these three variables. Our findings indicate that shocks from arms exports have direct spillovers over the labor productivity and GDP growth, whereas the reverse is not captured by our data. We also provide a dynamic analysis of the spillovers that confirm the direction of spillovers from arms exports to the other variables. The recent evolution of arms exports from the United States together with the changes in arms exports policy show the timeliness of studying the effects of this particular trade to the rest of the economy.

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“…Therefore, military spending, especially towards aerial firepower, is inextricably linked with a state's defensive military capabilities and its ability to deter foreign threats (Kollias 1996;Betts 1985). For instance, higher defence expenditures allow for the acquisition of more advanced military technology (Pamp andThurner 2017, Sechser andSaunders 2010) and improve civil-military relations (Leon 2014, Powell 2012 while to increase the armed forces' professionalism and tactical sophistication, it is similarly necessary to invest in higher salaries, regular multi-service military exercises, or the establishment of military academies. In contrast, decreases in military spending mean not only that the armed forces do not acquire new hardware, but that they may also struggle with maintaining their existing weaponry.…”

Section: Greek Military Spending and Deterrencementioning

confidence: 99%

Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

Choulis

Mehrl

Ifantis

2021

Defence and Peace Economics

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Arms races are linked in the public conscience to potential violence. Following gas discoveries in eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey nearly came to blows in August 2020 and both states have enacted military expansion plans, further risking escalation. We present a novel approach to study the effect of military build-ups on dispute intensity, using monthly data on Turkish incursions into Greek-claimed airspace. Because airspace claims feature strongly in the dispute, these contestations represent an appropriate measure of the intensity with which Turkey pursues the conflict. Theoretically, we suggest that bilateral factors drive this intensity. We argue that increased Greek military capabilities deter incursions whereas increased Turkish military capabilities fuel them. Results from time-series models support the second expectation. Consequently, the study provides a novel methodological approach to studying interstate conflict intensity and shines new light on escalation dynamics in the Greek-Turkish dispute.

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Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditures: Empirical Explorations Using New SIPRI-Data

Cited by 26 publications

References 45 publications

The build-up of coercive capacities

The build-up of coercive capacities

An Empirical Analysis of Arms Exports and Economic Growth Spillovers: The Case of the United States

Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

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