Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures

Keshk, Omar M. G.; Reuveny, Rafael; Pollins, Brian M.

doi:10.1177/0265659009352137

Cited by 57 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…In results not presented (due to space concerns, but available from the authors), we find that our results hold when replacing the dyadic rivalry dummy variable with continuous indicators of stability (Specifically, Signorino and Ritter's [1999] and Bueno de Mesquita's [1985] alliance similarity measures, from EUGene). Additionally, these concerns for spurious correlation due to an antecedent variable resemble those regarding endogeneity in trade and conflict studies (for example, Keshk, Pollins, and Reveny 2004;Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2010). In robustness checks (not presented but available from the authors), we find that our results hold in simultaneous equations models for reciprocal causation between trade and conflict.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 63%

Not All Peace Years Are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict

Peterson

Quackenbush

2010

International Interactions

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The peace through trade hypothesis receives extensive support from a large empirical literature. However, extant research does not isolate whether this relationship holds for states that have fought in the past, or whether its influence following armed disputes is dependent upon the ways in which states settle their conflicts. Additionally, although recent research finds that imposed settlements are more pacifying than other forms of political settlement, these studies tend not to isolate factors associated with variation in the stability of imposed settlements. In this article, we examine how settlements condition the influence of trade on conflict recurrence, both to overcome a limitation in extant studies of trade and conflict, which tend to ignore the way states settle prior disputes, and to further an understanding of how post-conflict state interaction varies by (and within) settlement type. Looking at dyadic trade and recurrent conflict from 1885 to 2000, we find that imposed settlements foster a pacifying effect of trade, while negotiated settlements and failures to reach settlement lead to relationships in which trade has crosscutting effects on the stability of peace, resulting in an overall null effect of trade on conflict recurrence.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 63%

Not All Peace Years Are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict

Peterson

Quackenbush

2010

International Interactions

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“…Keshk's (2003) two-stage probit least squares model offers some advantages over standard simultaneous equations models because its endogenous variables may also be dichotomous and continuous measures. Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins (2010) and Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010) rely on Keshk's simultaneous equations model. Unfortunately, because the endogenous variables in this study are a count measure (i.e., terrorism) and a dichotomous measure (i.e., economic sanctions), use of those simultaneous equations models will yield biased estimates.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causes of Domestic Terrorism: Economic Sanctions as a Violence Trigger Structure

Choi¹

2014

kjis

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This study examines whether the imposition of economic sanctions has relation to an increase in domestic terrorism, postulating that when sanctions impair the economic functioning of the target country, feelings of bitterness and despair are intensified among the poor who may then lash out by turning to domestic terrorism. A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 152 countries over the past three decades provides evidence that ceteris paribus, economic sanctions are positively associated with the incidence of domestic terror; this effect remains when reverse causality is taken into account. In order to clarify the role of poverty in this association, this study also introduces a two-step analysis in which sanctions are first considered a cause of poverty, and then predicted poverty levels are used to predict the occurrence of terrorism. This test for robustness confirms that economic sanctions do indeed lead to a rise in the rate of domestic terrorism.

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“…Although some suggest that controlling for distance is not important in models of trade and conflict (Keshk et al, 2010), I argue that including both distance and contiguity is necessary because capital cities might be quite far from each other, although two states share a border (e.g. Russia and China).…”

Section: Controlsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…But even with better methods, the debate continues over whether trade is associated with war, or peace, or whether there is no relationship (e.g. Hegre et al, 2010;Keshk et al, 2010;Li and Reuveny 2011). In this article, I suggest a theoretical rethinking by considering the process of international conflict onset and escalation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

International Trade and The Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict: More to Fight About, or More Reasons Not to Fight?

Goldsmith

2013

Defence and Peace Economics

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Although study of the relationship between international trade and militarized conflict has become more sophisticated, whether trade reduces the chance of conflict, exacerbates it, or has no effect, remains contested. Integrating expectations from schools of thought often portrayed as incompatible, I consider two aspects of trade -volume and interdependence -and model conflict as a two-stage process involving onset and escalation. This perspective leads to robust statistical findings that trade is Janus-faced, both facilitating and inhibiting conflict at different stages, supporting the conclusion that a focus on international conflict as a communication process promises better theory in international relations.

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Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures

Cited by 57 publications

References 48 publications

Not All Peace Years Are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict

Not All Peace Years Are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict

Causes of Domestic Terrorism: Economic Sanctions as a Violence Trigger Structure

International Trade and The Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict: More to Fight About, or More Reasons Not to Fight?

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