Tracking presidents and policies: environmental politics from Lula to Dilma

Abstract

Does the Brazilian presidential system shape environmental policy there? The comparative literature on environmental policy offers few reasons to think that it might. Most explanations of variations in the quantity and quality of environmental regulation stress levels of economic development or move outside of the nation-state to examine international processes of diffusion and convergence. Other studies look at large macrostructural differences like the contrast between democratic and authoritarian systems and/or the role of non-state actors. This article examines environmental policies and outcomes in three successive presidential administrations in Brazil to develop hypotheses about whether institutional factors should gain a larger place in comparative studies of environmental policies and outcomes.

Appearances can be Deceptive: Political Polarization, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil

“…For them, policies could be characterized as stable, unstable, and rigid. Hochstetler () argues that Brazil's policy outcomes would be connected to the president's preferences. Examining environmental policy in Brazil throughout three consecutive administrations—Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff—she indicates that policy changes in this area were largely explained by choices concerning the Ministers of the Environment (appointed by the president) and the importance of pork for coalition management.…”

From ‘Green Laggard’ to Regional Leader: Explaining the Recent Development of Environmental Policy in Chile

“…In fact, policy entrepreneurs ‘translate’ international norms to render them applicable to local contexts. Thus, international diffusion mechanisms tend to reinforce rather than change local institutions, making sudden policy shifts less common (see Hochstetler, : 262–263).…”

“…Their ability to do so depends on existing political institutions and how they mediate the access that diverse actors have to policymaking. For example, presidential regimes can offer special conditions for environmentally minded executives to foster environmental goals (Hochstetler, ). Similarly, institutions granting participation to business interests and/or civil society in the design and implementation of policy have different effects on the ability of bureaucracies to pass and implement green policies (Lemos and Looye, ; Amengual, ; Hochstetler and Kostka, ).…”

“…It is argued that this is due to a renewed commitment to environmental policy that reflects policy entrepreneurial capacity in the context of a presidential regime. Hochstetler (: 265) argues that the impact that presidents can have on environmental outcomes is mediated by how their environmental minister balances responsibility to coalition‐building strategies with responsiveness to civil society organisations. In this context, a comparison of cabinet nominations under Piñera and Bachelet is revealing.…”

Audaciosa Viagem Temporal sobre Perfis da Fauna Brasileira ao Longo dos Séculos

“…The environmental policy in Brazil suffers from synergistic cooperation in relation to other policies, especially the idiosyncrasy of public management around a decision-making system that hinders horizontal coordination in environmental management between the institutions (AZEVEDO-SANTOS, FEARNSIDE, OLIVEIRA, et al, 2017;HOCHSTETLER, 2017). Democratic rules broadly affect the power play in political decision-making process (STEIN & TOMMASI, 2007;CAPELLA, 2007;RODRIGUES et al, 2015).…”