2014
DOI: 10.11644/kiep.jeai.2014.18.2.279
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TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting

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Cited by 39 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…50 By contrast, RCEP's comparatively lower ambitions and greater flexibilities could facilitate its speedy expansion. 51 Therefore, RCEP, if successfully implemented, has a strategic opportunity to outgrow the CPTPP as a premier vehicle for catalyzing the development of an FTAAP. It may be true that a return to the (CP)TPP by the United States, however unlikely, would make a difference, but the soft power dissipation of the (CP)TPP bloc cannot be reversed unless Washington breaks clean with its current policy trajectory that clouds trans-Pacific relations and recovers its image as a credible and benign leader that believes in rules-based trading order rather than a power-or sovereignty-based one.…”
Section: Coexistencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…50 By contrast, RCEP's comparatively lower ambitions and greater flexibilities could facilitate its speedy expansion. 51 Therefore, RCEP, if successfully implemented, has a strategic opportunity to outgrow the CPTPP as a premier vehicle for catalyzing the development of an FTAAP. It may be true that a return to the (CP)TPP by the United States, however unlikely, would make a difference, but the soft power dissipation of the (CP)TPP bloc cannot be reversed unless Washington breaks clean with its current policy trajectory that clouds trans-Pacific relations and recovers its image as a credible and benign leader that believes in rules-based trading order rather than a power-or sovereignty-based one.…”
Section: Coexistencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beijing's proposal covered just trade in goods; Tokyo's included issues such as services, investment and intellectual property. Ultimately the EAS geometry prevailed and talks were launched toward RCEP, based on those countries which already had bilateral PTAs with ASEAN (Hamanaka 2014).…”
Section: Variable Geometriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, it has been widely noticed that TPP and RCEP each excludes one of the region's and world's two largest economies: China is not party to the TPP negotiations, and the United States is absent from RCEP discussions. Several analysts have argued that TPP and RCEP are therefore the vehicles of a new phase of competitive regionalism in Asia (Armstrong 2011;Hamanaka 2014).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This division and the U.S. -China rivalry may undermine ASEAN's leadership in the regional trade architecture as well as in the regional political landscape. In order to preserve its central role as facilitator of economic and political arrangements in the region, ASEAN should play a proactive role in RCEP negotiations, and maintain its own unity and coherence (Fukunaga, 2015. andHamanaka, 2014). These arguments make it clear that international trade negotiations are impregnated with geopolitical rivalry among major economic powers.…”
Section: Box 1 Rcep and Tpp -Alliance Or Rivalry?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…18 The EU's goals concerning trade in goods and customs duties (tariffs as it's best known) is very simple: although industrial tariffs are generally fairly low (less than 2 percent in average in the EU-US trade) and over half of the transatlantic trade is not subject of duties/tariffs, but the rest faces extremely different duties/tariffs, some other duties/tariffs are even prohibitive. 19 In some cases, EU and US duties/tariffs are largely different even on the same products/group of 16 The three main chapters consist of 24 trade and investment issues. The European Commission "as part of its latest transparency initiative" has already published 27 fact sheets (2 page long each), 15 EU position papers ("these set out how we'd want a final deal to read, line by line") as well as 12 EU textual proposal ("what we want to achieve in a chapter".…”
Section: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Ttip)mentioning
confidence: 99%