Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement

Belleri, Delia; Palmira, Michele

doi:10.1163/9789401210508_008

Cited by 9 publications

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“…As hinted in our previous discussion (section 2), the Kaplanian approach to semantics has been taken up as a baseline framework to characterise the notion of disagreement in terms that square with referentialism. Belleri and Palmira (2013, p. 144), for instance, propose a counterfactual schema according to which A and B properly disagree iff the accuracy conditions of A's attitude towards p are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would render B's attitude towards q inaccurate, or vice‐versa (see also Palmira, 2018). Because intensions play no part in this schema, it is plausible to suggest that these authors rely on – indeed simply assume – a referential notion of disagreement.…”

Section: The Referentialist Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Knowledge of coreference is not a necessary condition because, as Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne have pointed out in a different context, agreement and disagreement in the static, attitudinal sense that concerns us here “is perfectly applicable to interaction‐free pairs of individuals so long as there is some view about the world that they share” (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, p. 60). For instance, ordinary people nowadays plausibly disagree with John Dalton, the chemist, over the indivisibility of atoms (Verdejo, 2016), and the ancient Greeks and Indians disagreed over funerary rituals before these civilisations got in touch with one another (MacFarlane, 2014, §6.1), or, likewise, Ptolemy and Galileo disagreed over the movement of celestial bodies even if they never got to know each other (Belleri and Palmira, 2013, p. 145). This point makes clear that A and B can be in disagreement without so much as knowing anything about one another, let alone the coreference of their respective terms.…”

Section: Responding To the Challenge (I)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Thinking Disagreement

Verdejo

Rodríguez

2021

Theoria

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In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the aforementioned challenge insofar as we discriminate between noncotenability affecting one's concepts, intensionally conceived, and noncotenability affecting merely one's particular understanding of those concepts. We conclude that intensional disagreement is our best choice for an account of disagreement at the level of thought.

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Section: The Referentialist Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Responding To the Challenge (I)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking Disagreement

Verdejo

Rodríguez

2021

Theoria

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“…7 This kind of attitude conflict has been articulated in terms of rational non-cotenability for the same subject (MacFarlane 2014, §6.2; Verdejo 2016), preclusion of joint satisfiability/accuracy (MacFarlane 2014, § §6.3-6.5), guarantee of inaccuracy of the other subject's attitude (Rieppel 2011;Belleri and Palmira 2013), propositional exclusion (Marques 2014) Now, reference to thoughtor any such relation short of literal sameness of instantiable thoughtcannot accommodate CARD in basic exchanges involving indexicals. For instance, relativised notions of disagreement take into consideration relevant contexts or circumstancessuch as contexts of utterance and contexts of assessment in MacFarlane's terminologywhen elucidating the required attitude conflict.…”

Section: Basic Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Call this, then, the Conflicting Attitudes Requirement for Disagreement. 7 This kind of attitude conflict has been articulated in terms of rational non-cotenability for the same subject (MacFarlane 2014, §6.2; Verdejo 2016), preclusion of joint satisfiability/accuracy (MacFarlane 2014, § §6.3-6.5), guarantee of inaccuracy of the other subject's attitude (Rieppel 2011;Belleri and Palmira 2013), propositional exclusion (Marques 2014) or linguistic denial (Sundell 2011), among others. Now, reference to thoughtor any such relation short of literal sameness of instantiable thoughtcannot accommodate CARD in basic exchanges involving indexicals.…”

Section: Basic Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self

Verdejo

2018

Dialectica

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Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought.

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“…Others argue for a unified notion of disagreement, e.g Belleri and Palmira (2013)Palmira (2015),Carter (2014), Eriksonn andTiozzo (2016) …”

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confidence: 99%

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism

Kusch¹

2019

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This paper presents reasons against semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is motivated by intuitions that are presumed to raise problems for traditional or contextualist semantics in contested domains of discourse. Intuition-based arguments are those based on competent speakers' putative intuitions about seeming faultless disagreement, eavesdropper, and retraction cases. I will organize the discussion in three parts. First, I shall provide a brief introduction to the intuition-based arguments offered in favor of semantic relativism. Second, I shall indicate that there are ways for contextualism to explain the (appearance of) intuitions that support semantic relativism. Third, I shall review some experimental results and independent arguments that put into question the appeal of semantic relativism. Intuition-based ArgumentsIntuitions about retraction and disagreement play a crucial role in arguments for semantic relativism about epistemic modals, deontic modals, conditionals, knowledge attributions, or value and personal taste claims: the use of these expressions seems to be dependent on people's perspectives, either on a relevant body of information available, or a relevant standard of taste. But while absolutists seem unable to capture the perspective-dependence of claims in that range, indexical-contextualists seem unable to account for the presumed intuitions of competent speakers involving disagreement and retraction cases. Disagreements between people with different perspectives in these areas seem to occur, as do retractions of past claims made by subjects after a change of perspective (where the perspective-independent facts remain the same). Likewise, we are owed a suitable explanation of what is going on with eavesdropper cases.

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Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Thinking Disagreement

Thinking Disagreement

Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism

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