Toward “hardened” accountability? Analyzing the European Union's hybrid transnational governance in timber and biofuel supply chains

Abstract

The voluntary/mandatory divide is a constant feature of scholarly debates on corporate accountability for sustainability in global supply chains. A widely held assumption is that the addition of state authority to private transnational governance in global supply chains will "harden" accountability and, thus, promote more sustainable production. The state's ability to set legally binding requirements is expected to coerce companies into complying. The hybridization of private and state authority is seen to strengthen good practice in private authority. This empirical study questions these assumptions based on an analysis of two hybrid governance arrangements for sustainability in global supply chains: the EU's Timber Regulation (EUTR) and Renewable Energy Directive (RED). The results demonstrate that both EUTR and EU-RED yield sector wide efforts of compliance and to this extent can be seen as enhancing accountability in the sense of answerability. At the same time, we find that the policies in both cases are not more demanding, nor enforced strictly, the latter putting into question their potential to coerce companies. Further, a "hardening" of accountability is at least obscured as both EUTR and EU-RED have stripped private authority they employ in their hybrid transnational governance from the need to establish legitimacy with a broader audience. This makes legal compliance and cost-effectiveness the core factor for companies' efforts to demonstrate compliance. Our findings hence question whether the EUTR and EU-RED have led to "hardened" accountability compared to private transnational governance, and ask for an empirical, more nuanced understanding of what there is to gain or lose from hybridizing private and state authority in transnational governance.

Putting the French Duty of Vigilance Law in Context: Towards Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the Global South?

“…While representing important steps for visibilizing and addressing the impacts of global commodity chains, the adopted regulations have been criticized for their lack of stringency, comprehensiveness, and enforcement (Moser and Leipold 2019;Partzsch 2020). For instance, based on the EUTR, companies cannot be held legally liable for noncompliance, but rather civil penalty fines are imposed on the responsible, typically administrative, personnel.…”

“…This problem seems to be of a more general and systemic nature. Previous studies on different kinds of due diligence policies similarly found that home states of TNCs have lacked important human resources and political will as well as relevant information to supervise global supply chains in a rigorous manner (Moser and Leipold 2019;Partzsch 2020; see "Hardening Corporate Accountability through Due Diligence Policies?"). In the absence of state action, French civil society organizations have assumed the task to monitor the implementation of the Duty of Vigilance law, by analyzing the quality of vigilance plans and by collecting reliable information about the negative externalities of TNCs abroad (interview with French human rights organization, 21 August 2019).…”

“…This study draws on and aims to contribute to previous literature from the field of political ecology that has addressed the extractive industries and their negative externalities in Latin America (e.g., Bebbington and Bury 2013;Arsel et al 2016;Leifsen et al 2017) and to the literature on new public regulatory approaches in the ambits of human rights and sustainable development to hold corporations accountable for their impacts abroad (e.g., Bartley 2014;Moser and Leipold 2019;Partzsch 2020). These literatures have previously developed separately.…”

“…Previous literature on new corporate accountability norms for regulating global commodity chains has largely departed from the assumption that the state's ability to set legally binding requirements can coerce companies into complying to a greater extent than private and mainly voluntary measures (Bartley 2014). However, empirically grounded research into previous mandatory supply chain regulations from the demand side has shown that the adopted norms have not necessarily contributed to 'hardened" accountability, i.e., more stringent regulations, better enforcement, and more democratic legitimacy (Moser and Leipold 2019; see "Hardening Corporate Accountability through Due Diligence Policies?"). In this paper, I draw on such previous research but also aim to extend it in two respects.…”

Transnational sustainability certification for the bioeconomy? Patterns and discourse coalitions of resistance and alternatives in biomass exporting regions

“…-not including some important sustainability aspects related to biofuel production, such as indirect landuse change or social aspects in general [see, e.g., 37,38], -a lack of supervision of the recognized voluntary schemes [see, e.g., 37-39], -a lack of transparency in the certification and auditing process [see, e.g., 38,40], -the proliferation and fragmentation of recognized schemes, which leads to a kind of 'race to the bottom' in complying with sustainability criteria [see, e.g., 38,40], or -a lack of democratic legitimacy as regards the participation of affected stakeholders and the accountability of involved industrial actors [see, e.g., [37][38][39].…”