Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem

Einheuser, Iris

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00765.x

Cited by 37 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Si, por el contrario, E es contingente, entonces esto acaba con la necesidad de F. Otros autores que han dirigido el argumento de la contingencia en contra del convencionalismo modal son: Lewy (1976), Van Cleve (1994, Elder (2006), Hanks (2007), Lange (2008) y Morato (2014. Entre los autores que han criticado el viejo argumento de la contingencia se incluyen: Wright (1985), Hale (2002), Einheuser (2006), Cameron (2010), Wildman (2017), Livingstone-Banks (2017) y Topey (2019). De los artículos recientes sobre el tema ninguno discute el giro que Sidelle le da al argumento de la contingencia para lanzarlo en contra de la combinación de convencionalismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos.…”

Section: El Argumento Básico De Sidelle a Partir De La Contingencia D...unclassified

Sobre un argumento en contra de la combinación de anti-realismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos

Varela

2020

Tópicos (México)

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Algunos filósofos piensan que el anti-realismo sobre la necesidad de re implica anti-realismo sobre la individuación e identidad de objetos. En este trabajo me ocupo de un argumento a favor de esta tesis, debido a Sidelle (2010), según el cual la única manera en que un convencionalista modal de re puede evitar ser refutado por un conocido argumento basado en la contingencia de las convenciones es aceptando también un convencionalismo sobre objetos. Muestro que el argumento de Sidelle no es exitoso y, de esta manera, muestro que la combinación de anti-realismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos no se ve amenazada, al menos, por esta vía.

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Section: El Argumento Básico De Sidelle a Partir De La Contingencia D...unclassified

Sobre un argumento en contra de la combinación de anti-realismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos

Varela

2020

Tópicos (México)

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“…But in order to adopt them, Pereboom would have to adapt them to the case of the modal differences between token mental property instantiations and the token physical property instances that (on his view) compose them, and this poses particular problems. For example, a popular family of views has it that the sortal and modal features that distinguish the coincident are grounded in human linguistic or conceptual activities: for example, in our adopting certain linguistic or conceptual conventions (Sidelle, ; Thomasson, ; Einheuser, ). But Pereboom must reject this style of view, at least with respect to grounding the modal features that distinguish mental property instances and the physical property instances that constitute them.…”

Section: The Constitution Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom

Ball

2014

Philosophical Books

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Derk Pereboom's Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism is a dense and subtle work. Its  pages are divided into discussions of three topics: an attempt to respond to the knowledge argument and conceivability argument on the grounds that introspection may misrepresent the properties of experience; a development of Russellian monism; and an account of mental properties on which they are "compositional" properties whose instantiations can be constituted by instantiations of physical properties. The three discussions are almost completely independent, so that the book is closer to a collection of three long articles than to a typical monograph. Despite its title, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism does not purport to be anything like comprehensive catalog of theories of consciousness or of responses to arguments against physicalism; rather than evaluating alternative views, Pereboom seeks to create new prospects for physicalism (though these prospects are firmly situated within the familiar dialectic developed by Chalmers, Kim, and others). Throughout, Pereboom makes use of his unique philosophical skill set; perhaps no other contemporary philosopher can shift so fluently from Kant and Leibniz, to contemporary metaphysics, to philosophy of mind.A critic capable of emulating Pereboom's density and concision might have tried to discuss all three parts of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism in the space allotted for this notice. But I will neglect Pereboom's development of Russellian monism, and focus on his possible-misrepresentation based response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments (in section ), and his constitution based account of the mind and mental causation (in section ).

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“…Elsewhere the worry is expressed in terms of the grounding problem: given all that the collection of particles and the table have in common, what could possibly explain why they have different modal, historical, sortal, or other qualities? 7 (For responses to the grounding problem, see Johnston 1997, 53–59; Bennett 2004; Lowe 2005, 521–2; Thomasson 2007, 81–6; Einheuser, forthcoming. )…”

Section: Why Is There a Controversy About The Existence Of Ordinarmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

Thomasson

2010

Philosophy Compass

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The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects – including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co‐location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.

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Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem

Cited by 37 publications

References 24 publications

Sobre un argumento en contra de la combinación de anti-realismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos

Sobre un argumento en contra de la combinación de anti-realismo modal de re y realismo sobre objetos

Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

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