Toward a club of carbon markets

Keohane, Nathaniel O.; Petsonk, Annie; Hanafi, Afrizal

doi:10.1007/s10584-015-1506-z

Cited by 83 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…Discounting carbon credits and using baselines below business-as-usual were put forward as potential ways to provide "net mitigation" (Warnecke, 2014). One of the suggestions to boost ambition, was the creation of a Club of Carbon Markets (CCM) that would establish common standards for market infrastructure, transparency and environmental integrity (Keohane, Petsonk, & Hanafi, 2017). It was argued that such a club could foster increased participation in climate change mitigation in the same way as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helped broaden trade in products and services.…”

Section: Increasing the Mitigation Ambitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Michaelowa

Shishlov

Brescia

2019

WIREs Climate Change

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The Paris Agreement will greatly benefit from the past experience with international market mechanisms for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and related regulatory systems, which have gone through four periods with specific challenges. The first period 1997–2004 operationalized the mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Pilot activities in different sectors were undertaken by the public sector, and the first baseline and monitoring methodologies officially approved. Between 2005 and 2011, the carbon markets expanded massively. The EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) was linked to the Kyoto mechanisms, creating demand for carbon credits from the private sector. During this “gold rush” period criticism emerged with regarding the uneven geographical distribution of projects, as well as environmental integrity problems related to baselines and additionality. The next period saw a collapse in carbon prices between 2012 and 2014, limiting the development of new projects. The quantitative limits on the use of offsets in the EU ETS were reached and the failure to agree on a new international regime resulted in a drying up of demand from governments. The 2015–2018 period is characterized by a gradual stabilization of the international climate regime. The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 increases complexity through global participation in mitigation. Future carbon markets will therefore face both old challenges—supply–demand balance, environmental integrity, transaction costs—and new ones—interactions with other policies and national targets, and sectoral/policy baselines and additionality checks preventing hot air proliferation. This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior

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Section: Increasing the Mitigation Ambitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Michaelowa

Shishlov

Brescia

2019

WIREs Climate Change

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“…If international rules are not deemed sufficient, countries could address environmental integrity issues by forming 'carbon clubs' or committing to political declarations (Keohane, Petsonk, & Hanafi, 2017). Yet these approaches can only address environmental integrity by the participating countries, which may limit their effectiveness.…”

Section: International Rules Versus Responsibility By Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

Schneider

Theuer²

2018

Climate Policy

110

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“…Moreover, being a member of this "club of carbon markets" (Keohane, Petsonk, & Hanafi, 2017) to a certain extent legitimates the lack of transformational climate responses given that the bloc's emphasis on carbon pricing is far from transformational.…”

Section: Incorporating Stakeholder Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

Fueling Climate (In)Action: How organizations engage in hegemonization to avoid transformational action on climate change

Ferns

Amaeshi

2019

Organization Studies

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This study examines how organizations avoid the urgent need for transformational action on climate change by engaging in a hegemonization process. To show how this unfolds, we draw from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, focusing on the case of BP and its engagement with the climate change debate from 1990 to 2015. Our study takes a longitudinal approach to illustrate how BP defended its core business of producing and selling fossil fuel products by enacting three sequential hegemonization strategies. These included: adopting new signifiers; building ‘win-win’ relationships; and adapting nodal points. In doing so, we demonstrate how hegemonic construction enables organizations to both incorporate and evade various types of stakeholder critique, which, we argue, reproduces business-as-usual. Our study contributes to organization studies literature on hegemony by highlighting how the construction of hegemony operates accumulatively over an extended period of time. We also contribute more broadly to conversations around political contests and the natural environment by illustrating how the lack of effective climate responses is shaped by temporal dynamics.

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Toward a club of carbon markets

Cited by 83 publications

References 23 publications

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

Fueling Climate (In)Action: How organizations engage in hegemonization to avoid transformational action on climate change

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