Torn between state and market: Private policy implementation and conflicting institutional logics

Abstract

Policy implementation by private actors constitutes a “missing link” for understanding the implications of private governance. This paper proposes and assesses an institutional logics framework that combines a top-down, policy design approach with a bottom-up, implementation perspective on discretion. We argue that the conflicting institutional logics of the state and the market, in combination with differing degrees of goal ambiguity, accountability and hybridity play a crucial role for output performance. These arguments are analyzed based on a secondary analysis of seven case studies of private and hybrid policy implementation in diverging contexts. We find that aligning private output performance with public interests is at least partly a question of policy design congruence: private implementing actors tend to perform deficiently when the conflicting logics of the state and the market combine with weak accountability mechanisms.

Serving many masters: Public accountability in private policy implementation

“…Research consistently shows that the delegation of regulatory tasks to market actors fails to deliver the expected results (Overman, ). Indeed, market elements in policy implementation can worsen output performance instead of improving it (Dias & Maynard‐Moody, ; Thomann et al, ). By linking the hybridity literature with accountability concepts and moving beyond case studies to analyze a unique large set of for‐profit street‐level bureaucrats, our article sheds light on the still poorly understood mechanisms that underlie such findings.…”

“…Our analysis focuses on horizontal accountability dilemmas between rule pressure and incentive, vocational or societal pressure, rather than on vertical dilemmas at different levels of aggregation (Hupe & Van der Krogt, ). An example of a dilemma between rule and incentive pressure would be when a veterinarian's inspection duties diminish profits or alienate customers (Thomann, Lieberherr, & Ingold, ; see also Dias & Maynard‐Moody, ). Rule and vocational pressure clash when street‐level bureaucrats perceive the demands of the policy to be incongruent with their professional values, norms, and attitudes (Tummers, Vermeeren, et al, , pp.…”

‘We are this hybrid’: Members’ search for organizational identity in an institutionalized public–private partnership

“…The analysis highlights the importance of studying the challenges of organizational hybridity for members as a collective. While hybridity poses significant challenges for both organizations (Greenwood et al ; Coule and Pathmore ; Thomann et al ) and individuals (Schott et al ; Croft et al ; McGivern et al ; Spyridonidis et al ), iPPP members grapple with the question of what their hybrid organization may be (see Rondeaux , ; Buffat ) as is evident in the accounts. Through the two sensemaking mechanisms identified here, the analysis emphasizes the largely neglected interplay between the organizational and collective levels (see Denis et al ; Bevort and Suddaby ).…”

“…Moreover, the introduction of a new logic may be incompatible with the organization's history and purpose, which is pertinent in a hybridizing public sector (Kuipers et al ; Fossestøl et al ). While some organizations succeed by creating new structures (Reay and Hinings ) or creatively exploiting contradictions in institutional logics (Coule and Pathmore ), others fail to fulfil their economic potential (Thomann et al ).…”

The Influence of Administrative Traditions and Governance on Private Involvement in Urban Climate Change Adaptation

“…The ability of urban administrations to involve the private sector and citizens has been little researched so far, and an examination of existing urban governance context is lacking in the literature when the call for wider participation is made. We argue that these emerging public‐private cooperations in adaptation will be influenced by prevailing administrative traditions that condition existing governance approaches (Harman, Taylor, & Lane, ; Kuronen, Junnila, Majamaa, & Niiranen, ; Taylor & Harman, ; Thomann, Lieberherr, & Ingold, ). Focusing on how administrative traditions influence governance approaches, it is possible to examine how the implementation of adaptation proceeds and what actors become involved and with what policy instruments (Adger, Quinn, Lorenzoni, Murphy, & Sweeney, ; Thynne & Peters, ).…”