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DeRose, James V.

doi:10.1021/ed057p70

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Anyone who derives the former object-language version from the latter metalinguistic version commits the so-called fallacy of semantic descent. 17 Cohen too is aware of this difference when he writes:…”

Section: Can Knowledge Get Lost?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Brendel

2005

Acta Anal

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Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is shown that there is no context in which the contextualist can truthfully claim to know her theory is true. Since these results were obtained only with principles the contextualist cannot give ulr--like the principle of epistemic closure and the principle that knowledge implies truth it seems that contextualism is in need of a thoroughgoing revision if it is to become a successful epistemic theory.

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Section: Can Knowledge Get Lost?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Brendel

2005

Acta Anal

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“…But (ii) if we endorse contextualism about knowledge, skeptical hypotheses do not cast doubt on as much of our knowledge; we can know that we have hands in most contexts if we endorse contextualism. 46 Because of (i) and (ii) traditional non-contextualist views about knowledge suffer a severe loss in plausibility relative to contextualist views if they do not have a response to skeptical arguments. Similarly, I have argued that (i*) if in ideal conditions agreement would not emerge about the moral status of most of the actions and practices about whose moral status we currently disagree, then most of the actions about whose moral status we currently disagree do not have a moral status.…”

Section: All Non-naturalists Holdmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

Rowland

2016

Nous

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This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non‐naturalism and quasi‐realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non‐naturalism and quasi‐realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non‐naturalism, quasi‐realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions.

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“…Nonetheless, contextualism seems ready made to explain how stakes can affect knowledge. 26 So in what follows I provide a contextualist diagnosis of the experimental philosophy results. The discussion here closely resembles some ideas in DeRose (forthcoming).…”

Section: A Response On Behalf Of Contextualistsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology

Pinillos

2011

Philosophy Compass

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I survey here some recent work on experimental philosophy and its bearing on some current debates in Epistemology. In the first part of the paper, I survey some general methodological issues concerning the relevance of folk judgments (a domain of study of experimental philosophy) to Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism (IRI). In the second part, I provide a critical review of several experiments some of which have been thought to disfavor contextualism and IRI, and others which have been thought to favor contrastivism (a type of contextualism).

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To see for yourself

Abstract: Students are more likely to find chemistry understandable and interesting if their knowledge of chemicals and the major

Cited by 6 publications

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Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹

Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology

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To see for yourself

Abstract: Students are more likely to find chemistry understandable and interesting if their knowledge of chemicals and the major

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism

The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement1

Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology

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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement¹