Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis

Zhang, Zhenghao; Gong, Sen; Dimitrovski, Aleksandar; Li, Husheng

doi:10.1109/tsg.2012.2227342

Cited by 263 publications

(142 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…For example, in [122], the authors showed that spoofing the GNSS signal at smart grid synchrophasors can result in deteriorated transmission line fault detection, incorrect voltage stability monitoring and poor event localization.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Clock Synchronization Over Packet-Switched Networks

Lévesque

Tipper

2016

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

106

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Abstract-Clock synchronization is a prerequisite for the realization of emerging applications in various domains such as industrial automation and the intelligent power grid. This paper surveys the standardized protocols and technologies for providing synchronization of devices connected by packet-switched networks. A review of synchronization impairments and the stateof-the-art mechanisms to improve the synchronization accuracy is then presented. Providing microsecond to sub-microsecond synchronization accuracy under the presence of asymmetric delays in a cost-effective manner is a challenging problem, and still an open issue in many application scenarios. Further, security is of significant importance for systems where timing is critical. The security threats and solutions to protect exchanged synchronization messages are also discussed.

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Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Clock Synchronization Over Packet-Switched Networks

Lévesque

Tipper

2016

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

106

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“…x ′ is the processing result of the noise term in (1). It is also a zero-mean Gaussian random variable.…”

Section: Measurement Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It may cause serious consequences, especially for the important infrastructure using GNSS services. For example, if the timing GNSS receivers used by smart grid were spoofed, and the time solution were dragged away, it may cause power transmitting failure [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Spoofing Interference Source Localization Using Pseudo-range and RSS Measurements

Xiao¹,

Zeng²,

Li³

2017

Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Conference on Machinery, Electronics and Control Simulation (MECS 2017)

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Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing interference can mislead the target receiver in reporting wrong position, velocity and time results, which is a serious threat to the security of GNSS applications. Localizing and destroying the interference source is a complete way to clear the threat. In this paper, an algorithm is proposed to locate interference source using both pseudo-range and received signal strength (RSS) measurements, which are from the spatially distributed GNSS receivers. The algorithm has two stages. In the first stage, the distances between the interference source and receivers are estimated using weighted least-squares (WLS) method. And then source position is estimated using the estimated distances in the second stage. This algorithm's computation burden is low, and its solution doesn't divergence even if the measurements' accuracy is low. In addition, the mathematical derivation shows that the solution can reach the CRLB accuracy. Simulations corroborate the theoretical results and the good performance of the proposed method.

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“…The authors also elaborate on countermeasures against GPS jamming in modern GPS receivers. Zhang et al (2013) presents an integrity attack on GPS signals with respect to time synchronization. The authors show how the injection of targeted GPS signals increases the effect of the attack in comparison to the arbitrary error introduced by availability attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

Friedberg

Laverty

McLaughlin

et al. 2015

Electronic Workshops in Computing

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Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids -a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.

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Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis

Cited by 263 publications

References 18 publications

A Survey of Clock Synchronization Over Packet-Switched Networks

A Survey of Clock Synchronization Over Packet-Switched Networks

GNSS Spoofing Interference Source Localization Using Pseudo-range and RSS Measurements

A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

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