A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

Abstract

Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids -a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.

Microgrid Cyber-Security: Review and Challenges toward Resilience

“…The research presented in [20] demonstrates the possibility of authentic corruption caused by two types of cyber-attacks (availability and integrity attacks) jeopardizing the ICT and the GPS systems required for the sane functioning of a microgrid in three different operating modes (connected, islanded and sync-islanded). The severity of the physical impact which may vary between local blackout, the main instability violation of power quality equipment damage and human danger witnessed in the example microgrid is strongly related to its own architecture.…”

“…Indeed, physical prerequisites and the current state of the power system architecture with contemporary defense mechanisms, such as controllers prepared to re-examine each input parameter against a selection of acceptable values preventing possible physical damages [20], burden the attacker with the mandatory acquisition of a customized knowledge about the physical nature of the system added to the already required computer-related competencies. But then again, this does not mean that the conventional ways of protection, such as the ones adopted to restrain the spread of fault effects by isolating of a malfunctioning entity, are enough to prevent an attacker from achieving an unacceptable condition in the grid [20]. Effects range from tampering smart meters data or manipulating the forecasted load profiles up to reaching equipment damage or even complete blackouts [19].…”

Demonstrating Cyber-Physical Attacks and Defense for Synchrophasor Technology in Smart Grid

“…Synchrophasor technology was introduced in the early 1980s with a limited view of emerging wide-area applications [7]. Most real-time control applications are still at the laboratory validation stage facing security as a major concern [8], [9]. Phasor devices integrated in power systems mainly use IEEE C37.118.2 communication framework which is susceptible to cyber-attacks due to lack of inherent security features [4].…”

On the Impact of Wireless Jamming on the Distributed Secondary Microgrid Control

“…Some related works show countermeasures to attacks against the economic dispatch or other tertiary control objectives, e.g., a regret matching based anti-jamming algorithm is considered in [10]. Regarding the secondary control, it is noted in [11] that the most critical phase is the change of operation mode, but the considered system has a centralized control. In this work, we show that an attack to the distributed secondary control leads to more severe consequences and can undermine the grid stability.…”