Ticked Off, but Scared Off? Riots and the Fate of Nonviolent Campaigns*

Abstract

Research on the relationship between nonviolent and violent dissent has focused on explicit shifts in organized strategies, disregarding less-organized forms of violence such as riots. Even though disorganized violence is common, we know little about how it influences the onset and fate of antigovernment nonviolent campaigns. Activists frequently argue that nonviolent discipline is essential and disorganized violence is counterproductive for effective large-scale mobilization. However, others emphasize how disorganized violence could have a mobilizing effect on large-scale protest and revitalize a nonviolent campaign. We detail these competing perspectives on how riots can influence the onset and outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. We then evaluate these contending claims empirically by examining how riots affect the initial emergence of nonviolent campaigns and the likelihood that campaigns will terminate. We find that nonviolent mobilization is less likely to emerge after riots, and ongoing campaigns are more likely to collapse under higher rates of rioting.

Violent Political Protest: Introducing a New Uppsala Conflict Data Program Data Set on Organized Violence, 1989-2019

“…There is a growing scholarly interest in the dynamics and effect of riots, including political riots (e.g. Abbs and Gleditsch 2021, Aidt and Leon 2016, Kadivar and Ketchley 2018). To help the field to think more carefully about cases that are in-between the categories of violent and nonviolent tactics, VPP can represent an interesting way to further analyze and deepen the understanding of the actual empirical trajectories in many contemporary social conflicts.…”

Learning from Criticisms of Civil Resistance

“…Steinert-Threlkeld et al (2021) argue that protest violence reduces participation. Abbs and Gleditsch (2021) conclude that riots have a damaging effect on nonviolent activism.…”

“…When faced with repression, legitimacy plays an even bigger role, as the backfire effect is only activated and participation increased if repression can be framed as disproportionate and/or illegitimate. The chances of this happening decrease when nonviolent discipline is broken and campaign violence occurs (Abbs and Gleditsch, 2021). It is less likely for potential participants and supporters to identify with a campaign that uses violence, as it is more easily portrayed as unjust and illegitimate (Benford and Snow, 2000).…”

Reinforcing Criticisms of Civil Resistance: A Response to Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin

“…This of course does not mean that all cases featuring unarmed violence will lead to similar outcomes, but it is worth noting that Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin (2021) assume that unarmed violence is not effective in bringing about campaign success. They bring up several studies that show a dampening effect of unarmed violence on campaign outcomes (Abbs and Gleditsch, 2021; Huet-Vaughn, 2013; Steinert-Threlkeld et al, 2021), while concurrently they disregard studies that find the opposite. They reference the following studies: the Huet-Vaughn work is based on data from one country, France, while Abbs and Gleditsch assess campaigns that arose in Africa and Central America from 1990–2013, do not investigate “success,” but rather, analyze the onset (emergence) of nonviolent campaigns as well as their termination (end).…”