2010
DOI: 10.1177/1362361310366314
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Theory of own mind in autism

Abstract: Assuming that self-awareness is not a unitary phenomenon, and that one can be aware of different aspects of self at any one time, it follows that selective impairments in selfawareness can occur. This paper explores the idea that autism involves a particular deficit in theory of own . This hypothesised deficit renders individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) at least as impaired at recognising their own mental states as at recognising mental states in other people. This deficit, it is argued, stands in … Show more

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Cited by 142 publications
(64 citation statements)
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References 71 publications
(55 reference statements)
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“…Similarly, in this paper, the only finding we failed to replicate was atypical memory performance in individuals with ASD on the recall test (the only results in the paper that in any way indicated action monitoring is impaired in ASD). As such, it is argued that this study, and the enactment effect literature in general, provides support for theories that suggest action monitoring should remain unimpaired in individuals with ASD (e.g., Lind, 2010;Williams, 2010).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…Similarly, in this paper, the only finding we failed to replicate was atypical memory performance in individuals with ASD on the recall test (the only results in the paper that in any way indicated action monitoring is impaired in ASD). As such, it is argued that this study, and the enactment effect literature in general, provides support for theories that suggest action monitoring should remain unimpaired in individuals with ASD (e.g., Lind, 2010;Williams, 2010).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…Thus, arguably, the results from the above studies do not necessarily show that metacognition is impaired in ASD, because these tasks require inferences to be drawn about past mental states (but see Williams, 2010, for a counter-argument).…”
Section: Metacognition In Autism Spectrum Disordermentioning
confidence: 97%
“…On average, across studies involving a sum total of 239 individuals with ASD and 240 comparison participants, memory for self-performed actions was 10% better than memory for observed actions among individuals with ASD, and 11% better among comparison participants (a negligible difference between groups; Cohen's d = 0.11). This suggests strongly that individuals with ASD are able to monitor their own actions and that this monitoring enhances memory in a typical manner (see Williams, 2010). This pattern of impaired episodic memory in ASD, but intact action monitoring ability, supports the suggestion that individuals with ASD demonstrate selective impairments in self-awareness (see e.g., Williams, 2010), demonstrating typical physical self-awareness (e.g., actionmonitoring ability) but impairments in mental self-awareness (e.g., episodic memory) .…”
Section: Intention Superiority and Enactment Effects In Asdmentioning
confidence: 99%