Theory of mind in utterance interpretation: the case from clinical pragmatics

Abstract

The cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is an area that continues to provoke intense theoretical debate among pragmatists. That utterance interpretation involves some type of mind-reading or theory of mind (ToM) is indisputable. However, theorists are divided on the exact nature of this ToM-based mechanism. In this paper, it is argued that the only type of ToM-based mechanism that can adequately represent the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is one which reflects the rational, intentional, holistic character of interpretation. Such a ToM-based mechanism is supported on conceptual and empirical grounds. Empirical support for this view derives from the study of children and adults with pragmatic disorders. Specifically, three types of clinical case are considered. In the first case, evidence is advanced which indicates that individuals with pragmatic disorders exhibit deficits in reasoning and the use of inferences. These deficits compromise the ability of children and adults with pragmatic disorders to comply with the rational dimension of utterance interpretation. In the second case, evidence is presented which suggests that subjects with pragmatic disorders struggle with the intentional dimension of utterance interpretation. This dimension extends beyond the recognition of communicative intentions to include the attribution of a range of cognitive and affective mental states that play a role in utterance interpretation. In the third case, evidence is presented that children and adults with pragmatic disorders struggle with the holistic character of utterance interpretation. This serves to distort the contexts in which utterances are processed for their implicated meanings. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the role of theorizing in relation to utterance interpretation.

Sincere, Deceitful, and Ironic Communicative Acts and the Role of the Theory of Mind in Childhood

“…The novelty of the present research was to explore the causal role of age and ToM – both first- and second-order - in explaining children’s pragmatic performance, in both the linguistic and non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities. Some authors have indeed proposed that pragmatics/communicative ability involves mentalizing, i.e., ToM, abilities ( Sperber and Wilson, 2002 ; Tirassa et al, 2006a , b ; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008 ; Fernandez, 2011 ; Bosco et al, 2012b ; Cummings, 2015 ). In line with this proposal we found a correlation, controlling for age, between overall ToM tasks (first- and second-order tasks) and linguistic and extralinguistic irony and deceit, but not between linguistic sincere communicative acts and extralinguistic irony.…”

Exploring mentalization, trust, communication quality, and alienation in adolescents

“…Pragmatics includes: understanding the 'rules' of conversation [52]; comprehending non-literal language, such as sarcasm [104]; and considering communication within its social context [105]. Cummings [106] provided a summary of empirical literature supporting the proposition that mentalization, or ToM, underpins the pragmatics of communication by enabling an individual to infer a communication partners' thoughts, emotions, and beliefs. Also, a substantial evidence-base has established the role of pragmatic language deficits in social communication difficulties [52].…”

Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap

“…As far as the relationship between ToM and pragmatics is concerned, several authors have stressed that the ability to understand someone’s mental states and their relation with behavior is an undisputed requirement of human communication ( Happé and Loth, 2002 ; Sperber and Wilson, 2002 ; Tirassa et al, 2006a , b ; Bosco et al, 2009 ; Cummings, 2015 ). For example, the ability to deceive in communication has been commonly explained based on the ability to understand and foresee the interlocutor’s mental states ( Peskin, 1996 ; Polak and Harris, 1999 ; Lee, 2000 ; Ma et al, 2015 ).…”