Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions

Thatcher, Mark; Sweet, Alec Stone

doi:10.1080/713601583

Cited by 529 publications

(271 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(10 reference statements)

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“…A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (elected politician) sets broad policy parameters while the latter (appointed administrator or governing board) enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional depoliticisation -cast frequently around the creation of 'non-majoritarian' institutions (see Majone, 2001;Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002) -is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from shortterm political considerations -vote seeking, populist, short-term pressures to Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller Depoliticisation 298 which elected politicians are subject. It is notable that a significant aspect of British governance since the election of a Labour government in May 1997 has involved the application of institutional depoliticisation to a broad range of policy areas (see Table 3).…”

Section: Institutional Depoliticisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools

2006

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Section: Institutional Depoliticisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools

2006

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“…In case of superior bureaucratic resources and a lack of strong control mechanisms, there are may be opportunities for exerting influence (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). They differ throughout the policy process.…”

Section: Opportunitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Dijkstra

2012

European Security

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European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.

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“…The functionalist approach explains the delegation of certain tasks to independent bodies as the need for collective action, the necessity to resolve commitment problems as well as to overcome information asymmetries at the EU level (Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002). This approach brings us to the first category, i.e.…”

Section: Types Of Expertise Usementioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides

Rimkutė

2015

PaG

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Despite the growing importance of EU regulatory agencies in European decision-making, academic literature is missing a systematic explanation of how regulatory agencies actually contend with their core tasks of providing scientific advice to EU institutions. The article contributes to the theoretical explanation of when and under what conditions different uses of scientific expertise prevail. In particular, it focuses on theoretical explanations leading to strategic substantiating use of expertise followed by an empirical analysis of single case research. Substantiating expertise use refers to those practices in which an organisation seeks to promote and justify its predetermined preferences, which are based on certain values, political or economic interests. Empirical findings are discussed in the light of the theoretical expectations derived by streamlining and combining the main arguments of classical organisational and institutional theories and recent academic research. Process-tracing techniques are applied to investigate the process by which an EU regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid pesticides (European Commission, 2013) was developed. The empirical analysis combines a variety of data sources including official documents, press releases, scientific outputs, and semi-structured interviews with the academic and industry experts involved in the process. The study finds that the interaction between high external pressure and high internal capacity leads to the strategic substantiating use of expertise, in which scientific evidence is used to promote the inclinations of actors upon which the agency depends most.

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Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions

Cited by 529 publications

References 21 publications

Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools

Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides

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