Theorizing state-diaspora relations in the Middle East: Authoritarian emigration states in comparative perspective

Abstract

Recent scholarly interest in the politics of migration and diaspora across the Global South has yet to address how authoritarian states attempt to reach out to populations abroad. In an effort to shift the discussion on state-diaspora relations beyond liberal democratic contexts and single-case studies, this article comparatively examines how authoritarian emigration states in the Middle East -Libya, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordanbehave towards their own citizens living beyond state borders. It identifies how each state develops multi-tier diaspora engagement policies aimed at three separate stages of citizens' mobility: first, policies of exit regulate aspects related to emigration from the country of origin; second, overseas policies target citizens beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation state; finally, return policies set processes of readmission into the country of origin. In doing so, the article identifies similarities across disparate Middle East states' engagement with emigration and diaspora policymaking. At the same time, the article paints a more complex picture of non-democracies' strategies towards cross-border mobility that problematizes existing conceptualizations of authoritarian practices and state-diaspora relations.

Empowering a fragmented diaspora: Turkish immigrant organizations’ perceptions of and responses to Turkey’s diaspora engagement policy

“…The expanding scholarship on state-diaspora relations in the region has explored the relevance of human flows for citizenship; state authority, capacity, and strength; identity; and democracy (Moss, 2016;Pearlman, 2018) as well as for economic development and remittances (Iskander 2010;Fargues, 2013). Studies have also theorized the foreign policy importance of cross-border mobility in the MENA (Tsourapas, 2018a(Tsourapas, , 2018b and authoritarian states' different exit, overseas, and return policies aimed at their émigré communities (Tsourapas, 2018c).…”

The long arm of the Arab state

“…A second dimension of securitisation that relevant literature focuses on is transnational: for Glasius, authoritarian elites project their power abroad via extraterritorial authoritarian practices, as they conceive 'of the state as a collection of people to be governed, more than as a territorial entity' (Glasius 2017, 2). Scholars have recently examined authoritarian emigration states' de-territorialised security practices: they aim to repress diaspora groups abroad (Moss 2016;Adamson 2018), to develop a number of surveillance tactics in order to monitor their behaviour (Brand 2002), to mobilise pro-regime activists (Hirt and Mohammad 2017), to employ migrants as instruments of soft power (Tsourapas 2018a), or to prioritise certain diaspora communities over others (Tsourapas 2015;Koinova 2018). In this context, the migration-security nexus centres less on citizens' cross-border mobility, for there appears an implicit understanding of cross-border mobility as an economic opportunity; rather, it focuses on those residing beyond the territorial borders of the authoritarian countries of origin.…”

“…For analytic clarity, I approach emigration and diaspora policy-making as distinct processes(Tsourapas 2015(Tsourapas , 2196, with the former referring to processes governing the physical "exit" from a country, while the latter targeting those that are already outside the physical boundaries of the sending state.…”

The Long Arm of the Arab State

“…A second dimension of securitisation that relevant literature focuses on is transnational: for Glasius, authoritarian elites project their power abroad via extraterritorial authoritarian practices, as they conceive 'of the state as a collection of people to be governed, more than as a territorial entity' (Glasius 2017, 2). Scholars have recently examined authoritarian emigration states' de-territorialised security practices: they aim to repress diaspora groups abroad (Moss 2016;Adamson 2018), to develop a number of surveillance tactics in order to monitor their behaviour (Brand 2002), to mobilise pro-regime activists (Hirt and Mohammad 2017), to employ migrants as instruments of soft power (Tsourapas 2018a), or to prioritise certain diaspora communities over others (Tsourapas 2015;Koinova 2018). In this context, the migration-security nexus centres less on citizens' cross-border mobility, for there appears an implicit understanding of cross-border mobility as an economic opportunity; rather, it focuses on those residing beyond the territorial borders of the authoritarian countries of origin.…”

“…144). This instrumental appeal to patriotism, which tasked diaspora members with surveying and enforcing a state-led image of Tunisia abroad, was indicative of how power also worked in a more diffuse manner within the home state itself (Tsourapas 2013). 6…”