The long arm of the Arab state

Abstract

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Securitizing the nation beyond the state: diasporas as threats, victims, and assets

“…The securitization of ethnoreligious minorities targets those who are already inside the state territory, framing them as internal enemies (Buzan, 1993; Humphrey, 2009; Roe, 2004; Wæver et al, 1993), while the securitization of migration focuses on constructing incoming foreigners as threats to state or societal security (Bourbeau, 2011; Doty, 2007; Huysmans, 2000). The securitization of emigration targets domestic populations but criminalizes leaving the country, thus trying to keep domestic populations inside state territory (Tsourapas, 2020). In contrast, the securitization of a diaspora refers to populations that reside outside of the country yet are perceived as “inside the nation.” Thus, rather than necessarily constructing populations as threatening Others, the securitization of diasporas can refer to them as a part of the Self that needs to be protected or that contributes to state security.…”

“…Recent research regarding transnational repression indicates how authoritarian states securitize diasporic opposition voices, engaging in extra-territorial practices, such as surveillance, monitoring, threatening, punishing, and suspension of rights and freedoms (Cooley and Heathershaw, 2017; Glasius, 2018; Moss, 2016). 5 Tsourapas (2020) theorizes such securitization dynamics, focusing on the illiberal paradox—balancing a regime’s stability with economic developmental goals expected to be achieved via cross-border mobility. In more democratic settings, wherein freedom of expression and political dissent are more acceptable, we might expect to find fewer efforts to engage in such harsh tactics in favor of “softer” tactics such as public diplomacy or attempts to demobilize critical voices.…”

Digitized diaspora governance during the COVID‐19 pandemic: China's diaspora mobilization and Chinese migrant responses in Italy

“…Gamlen argues that emigration states ‘govern’ diasporas as a ‘normal form of political organization’ (Gamlen, 2008 , p. 842), which implicitly refers to democratic states extending political, civil and social rights to diaspora populations for capacity building (Gamlen et al., 2019 ); less has been theorized about authoritarian states extending their governing power beyond territorial borders. It has mainly been argued that out of legitimation and security concerns such states restrain and repress overseas dissidents (Dalmasso et al., 2017 ; Glasius, 2018 ; Tsourapas, 2018 , 2020 , 2021 ).…”

Networks do not float freely: (Dis)entangling the politics of Tamil diaspora inclusion in development governance

“…These practices are, on the whole, designed to encourage transnationalism, rather than suppress it. In contrast, building on ground‐breaking work by Laurie Brand (2006), which precedes the turn to ‘diaspora engagement policies’, a growing group of scholars has begun to study the extraterritorial practices of authoritarian states (Dalmasso et al., 2017; Glasius, 2018; Tsourapas, 2015, 2018, 2020). Authoritarian states, these scholars argue, show us that there exists a darker side to diaspora engagement, one that is perhaps less enshrined in formal policies and institutions and that is driven by state's security concerns.…”