Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas

Abstract

Jürgen Habermas' thinking gained influence within the German International Relations (IR) community in the early 1990s. At the core of the so-called ‘ZIB-debate’ was the controversy whether rationalist theory can explain interstate cooperation. Constructivists accused rationalists of ignoring communication, language and reason, thereby leaving a logical gap in their analyses of interstate cooperation. This gap exists between the plausible motivation for states to cooperate and their actual achievement of cooperation. Rationalist approaches assume that actors face problematic, interdependent situations, in which they can only optimise their preferences by collaboration. Such situations involve a plausible motivation for actors to cooperate but they are not a sufficient condition to ensure that cooperation will actually happen. What is missing is a theoretical link between a general motivation to cooperate and its realisation, given that rationalist theory, following realism, regularly assumes a dangerous anarchical environment with its daunting security dilemma. These circumstances make cooperation risky and should normally work as a show-stopper for nation-states to collaborate.

Democracy, Legitimacy and Soft Modes of Governance in the EU: The Empirical Turn

“…We are aware of the methodological difficulties in distinguishing arguing from bargaining in real world negotiation systems (cf. Risse 2000, Deitelhoff andMüller 2005). Still, the distinction remains valid from the theoretical viewpoint and might therefore be included in the assessment of the democratic legitimacy of SMGs.…”

The ‘Power of Process:’ How Negotiation Management Influences Multilateral Cooperation

“…Sebenius, 1992, Thompson, 2009 have all underlined the importance of negotiation modes as well. Generally, arguing enhances the generation and diffusion of ideas and thus foster agreement (Deitelhoff and Muller, 2005, Hopmann, 1995, Ulbert et al, 2004. A deliberative discourse can influence parties' perception of an issue, the related interests, and eventually negotiation position (Ulbert, et al, 2004, 34).…”

“…The common assumption remains, though, that arguing facilitates and positional bargaining undermines agreement (Deitelhoff and Muller, 2005, Hopmann, 1995, Thompson, 2009. This study will shed light on the still underexplored causal mechanism between discourse and outcome (O'Neill, et al, 2004, 163).…”

Dos aproximaciones a la racionalidad comunicativa: analizando la deliberación democrática y los procesos de aprendizaje colectivo

“…a speaker relating to other speakers in the social world, goes on" (Eder, 2007: 399). The implication of this argument is that deliberation, understood as the explicit or implicit giving and taking of reasons, should be seen less as a variable than as a constant in communication (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 172) -a constant which, as argued by Eder, should be taken into account in order to understand everyday communication, even communication that violates the rules of discourse (as in the example of a lie). The second point is that the aim of this social theory understanding of discourse is not so much to assess communication, but to account for certain features of linguistically mediated communication.…”