The Wrong Kind of Reason

Hieronymi, Pamela

doi:10.5840/jphil2005102933

Cited by 278 publications

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“…a reflective mode. They have been equally emphasised the epistemic domain by a number of writers, among whom: Burge (1995), Pettit and Smith (1996) , Scanlon (1998), Moran (2000), Hieronymi (2005Hieronymi ( , 2006. But not all of them lay emphasis in the same way upon the two features.…”

Section: The Kantian Stancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This kind of agency is different from the ordinary notion in that it does not involve voluntary act of the will, and locates our epistemic freedom in our reflective capacity to think ourselves as agents. There are, of course, several versions of this neo-Kantian view, among which Richard Moran's (2000) conception of beliefs as commitments, Richard Feldman's (2000) modest deontologism, and Pamela Hieronymi's (2006Hieronymi's ( , 2007 conception of evaluative control. In the present article, I shall focus on Hieronymi's version, because it is explicitly based on the distinction between two kinds of agency, and between two different notions of responsibility, among which only one is relevant to the epistemic domain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Engel

2009

Philosophical Explorations

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This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various "Kantian" views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility, in particular the one proposed by Pamela Hieronymi (2007). I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents

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Section: The Kantian Stancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Engel

2009

Philosophical Explorations

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“…is a psychological state and not something about what that psychological state refers to (although that would be okay as well). I am influenced here by Hieronymi (2005). another about whether intentions are like loves, cares, or values. All the wizardry argument does is express an undefended prejudice against bootstrapping.…”

Section: The Wizardry Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

One dogma of philosophy of action

Smith

2015

Philos Stud

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An oft-rehearsed objection to the claim that an intention can give one reasons is that if an intention could give us reasons that would allow an agent to bootstrap herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one. Such bootstrapping is utterly implausible. So, intentions to u cannot be reasons to u. Call this the bootstrapping objection against intentions being reasons. This essay considers four separate interpretations of this argument and finds they all fail to establish that non-akratic, nonevil, and deliberatively sound intentions cannot be reasons. The first argument is the argument from evil intentions, the second is the argument from akratic intentions, the third is the argument from errors in deliberation, and the last is what I call the 'wizardry' argument. This 'argument', put forward most clearly by John Broome, claims that intentions are so insubstantial that were they on their own reasons for action, that would amount to creating something out of nothing and that is impossible. The essay argues that the claim that intentions are insubstantial is too strong a premise to put forward without argument. For there are other attitudes that are on their own sufficient to generate reasons, such as loving attitudes. The essay then argues that the bootstrapping objection's status as dogma in the philosophy of action has led to insufficient attention being paid to the entirely reasonable question of whether intentions are sufficiently like other reasongiving attitudes, such as loving and valuing. It may turn out that, just as loving someone can give the loving person a reason to act in a certain, so too can intending to do something give someone a reason to act in a certain way, but we cannot effectively engage this question without first giving up our commitment to the bootstrapping objection as a central ''insight'' in philosophy of action. The essay concludes by proposing two research questions that are opened up by the 123Philos Stud (2016) 173:2249-2266 DOI 10.1007 abandonment of the bootstrapping objection as dogma, and proposes that we turn our philosophical attentions to those questions.

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“…22 See also Parfit (2001) and Persson (2007). part of the agents to somehow cause themselves to have the relevant attitudes. Another popular strategy is to accept that the Evil Demon does give us evaluative reasons, but claim that the reasons are of the wrong kind (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004;Olson 2004;Stratton-Lake 2005;Hieronymi 2005;Lang 2008;Way 2012). This response involves a challenge on part of its proponents to distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind.…”

Section: Against the Positive Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds

Garcia

Werkmäster

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation which aims to address this oversight and make the framework more informative. This interpretation, which is inspired by the recent work of Schroeder (2007) and Sobel (2016), claims that the relevant sense in which value can be determined by attitudes is discovered by seeing how facts can be endowed with the normative property of being a reason. We argue that this interpretation significantly deepens our understanding of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism.Keywords Constitutive grounds . Constitution . Value . Reasons . Subjectivism . Objectivism . Grounding On one understanding, subjectivism is the view that value is determined by attitudes and objectivism is the view that denies that this is so. 1 There are many other ways of Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2018) 21:155-167 https://doi

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The Wrong Kind of Reason

Cited by 278 publications

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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

One dogma of philosophy of action

Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds

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