The World Without, the Mind Within

Gallois, André

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511627880

Cited by 82 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…Many in the self-knowledge have a finger on this. Gallois (1999) argues that we can only possess first-person knowledge of beliefs that are subjectively justified. Moran (2001) claims that 'the expression of one's belief carries a commitment to its truth' (p. 92).…”

Section: Consciously Occupying the Perspective Of A Mental Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Doyle

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self‐knowledge of the reason‐responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first‐personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First‐person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one's point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self‐understanding.

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Section: Consciously Occupying the Perspective Of A Mental Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Doyle

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…In his article 'Transparency, Belief, Intention' in this journal, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that the route is inferential. Transparent selfknowledge, according to Byrne, involves an inference from world to mind; in particular, it involves an inference from the proposition that p to the proposition that one believes that p (a pattern which Byrne, following André Gallois (1996), calls the doxastic schema). 1 In what follows I will argue that this is a mistake: transparent self-©2011 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.…”

Section: Markos Valarismentioning

confidence: 99%

Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne

Valaris¹

2011

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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In his essay ‘Transparency, Belief, Intention’, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that transparency—our ability to form beliefs about some of our intentional mental states by considering their subject matter, rather than on the basis of special psychological evidence—involves inferring ‘from world to mind’. In this reply I argue that this cannot be correct. I articulate an intuitive necessary condition for a pattern of belief to count as a rule of inference, and I show that the pattern involved in transparency does not meet that condition. As a result, I conclude that transparency does not involve inference.

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“…1 For advocates of transparent introspection, see Byrne (2005), Crane (1998), Dretske (1995), Evans (1982), Falvey (2000), Fernandez (2003), Gallois (1996), Harman (1990), Moran (2001) and Tye (1995) to name but a few. For recent formulations of the inner sense theory, see Armstrong (1968, p. 323), Lycan (1996) and Rosenthal (1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe

Barz

2014

Theoria

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The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention to something extra‐mental should be epistemically justified in holding a belief about something intra‐mental. In his Naturalizing the Mind, Fred Dretske solves this problem by conceiving of introspection concerning visual experiences as an inference based on a connecting belief. Although Dretske's account proves defective upon closer inspection, its essence can be salvaged by looking upon introspection as being a game of make‐believe.

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The World Without, the Mind Within

Cited by 82 publications

References 0 publications

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne

Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe

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