“…The bid-ask spread can remain unchanged after regulation if there is no change in the competitiveness of the dealer sector. Empirically, the data show an increase in competition from nonregulated dealers (Bao et al 2018), which would help explain findings of decreased bid-ask spreads in certain contexts (Bao et al 2018;Trebbi and Xiao 2017).…”
Section: Proposition 6 (Bid-ask Spreads Under Liquidity Regulation)mentioning
confidence: 75%
“…The implication of this result is that a good way to assess the costs of regulation is by looking at price impacts, particularly when there are large imbalances of investor demand to buy or to sell. Empirical work in Dick-Nielsen 25 and Rossi (2018), Bao et al (2018) and Schultz (2017) has found increases in price impacts, particularly when immediacy is demanded.…”
Section: B Pricesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The neutrality result on the bid-ask spread, like the ambiguity result on trading volume, calls into question the usefulness of measuring bid-ask spreads and similar metrics (such as effective spreads or the Roll metric) to assess the costs of regulation, which forms part of the analysis in Bao et al (2018), Trebbi and Xiao (2017) and Anderson and Stulz (2017).…”
Section: Proposition 6 (Bid-ask Spreads Under Liquidity Regulation)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Trebbi and Xiao (2017); Adrian et al (2017); Anderson and Stulz (2017);Mizrach (2015). 4 However, Bao et al (2018) find specific events cause mildly wider bid-ask spreads, which the model can match if there is a withdrawal of a dealer from the market after the event.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Bao et al (2018); Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018); Schultz (2017). 3 Trebbi and Xiao (2017); Adrian et al (2017); Anderson and Stulz (2017);Mizrach (2015).…”
“…The bid-ask spread can remain unchanged after regulation if there is no change in the competitiveness of the dealer sector. Empirically, the data show an increase in competition from nonregulated dealers (Bao et al 2018), which would help explain findings of decreased bid-ask spreads in certain contexts (Bao et al 2018;Trebbi and Xiao 2017).…”
Section: Proposition 6 (Bid-ask Spreads Under Liquidity Regulation)mentioning
confidence: 75%
“…The implication of this result is that a good way to assess the costs of regulation is by looking at price impacts, particularly when there are large imbalances of investor demand to buy or to sell. Empirical work in Dick-Nielsen 25 and Rossi (2018), Bao et al (2018) and Schultz (2017) has found increases in price impacts, particularly when immediacy is demanded.…”
Section: B Pricesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The neutrality result on the bid-ask spread, like the ambiguity result on trading volume, calls into question the usefulness of measuring bid-ask spreads and similar metrics (such as effective spreads or the Roll metric) to assess the costs of regulation, which forms part of the analysis in Bao et al (2018), Trebbi and Xiao (2017) and Anderson and Stulz (2017).…”
Section: Proposition 6 (Bid-ask Spreads Under Liquidity Regulation)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Trebbi and Xiao (2017); Adrian et al (2017); Anderson and Stulz (2017);Mizrach (2015). 4 However, Bao et al (2018) find specific events cause mildly wider bid-ask spreads, which the model can match if there is a withdrawal of a dealer from the market after the event.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Bao et al (2018); Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018); Schultz (2017). 3 Trebbi and Xiao (2017); Adrian et al (2017); Anderson and Stulz (2017);Mizrach (2015).…”
In this article, we examine the success rate of the memorandum in two peripheral eurozone countries (Ireland and Greece) that had significant differences in organisational structures and their development models. For this reason, we measure the quantile dependence between the returns of corporate bond investors and exchange rates employing a novel econometric methodology, the cross-quantilogram. In Ireland, our key findings exhibit a higher rate of absorbing of structural reforms which contributes to more steady reinforcement of the enterprises, whether the European economy is stronger than the US or not. In contrast, Greece where the structural reforms are more intense, show a similar picture over a period longer than that of Ireland and only when the European economy goes beyond the US economy.
In compliance with legislation from the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) passed a final rule in June 2012 which requires banks and savings associations to actively monitor and assess their debt investments rather than passively relying on credit ratings. The OCC specifically directs these institutions to examine default risk by focusing on “operating and financial performance.” We utilize this regulatory change to examine how greater demand for information by major institutions impacts the corporate disclosures of issuers. We focus on forward looking management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and find greater bond market reaction to MEFs after the OCC rule. These results suggest that greater demand for information by bondholders has a significant impact on the quality of issuer's forward looking corporate disclosures.
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