The Virtuous Circles of Western Exposure in Russian Regions: A Case for Micro-Polity Analysis of Democratic Change

Abstract

The thirtieth anniversary of the fall of communism and the onset of democratisation across Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union represents a significant milestone. Democratic institutions and processes have now had sufficient time to mature, stagnate, degenerate, or be dismantled. Three decades provide sufficient time for fine-grained comparative analysis of post-communist countries. A decade or so ago, from the perspective of Orbán's Hungary or Kaczyński's Poland, the distinction between 'East' and 'West' looked to be more pronounced than ever. Today, the rise of the radical right and populism in Central and Eastern Europe show the extent to which parties in the region have been able to 'catch up' with the rest of Europe. At the time of writing, populist parties single-handedly or cumulatively gained above 30% of the vote in the last national elections in Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, peaking above 60% in Hungary.However, the impact of the migrant crisis or economic austerity on the quality of democracy, on public policy, the stability of political parties and manifestations of protest within the former communist states is invariably distinct. Hardly surprising perhaps given that their transitions to liberal democracy, market economies, and their accession to the EU have all occurred under pretty unique circumstances, barely resembling that experienced by their western neighbours. However, the days of viewing these countries as laggards, locked into a perennial process of catch-up, has long since passed. As article after article in this journal has charted, events occurring in the countries of Eastern Europe are likely to represent a precursor for what is to follow further west; an extreme reaction at the periphery or a more rapid and far-reaching impact amongst countries that are more vulnerable to economic crisis or other existential threats. Whereas once we assumed the party systems of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were on a western trajectory, or that Bulgarian civil society or Romanian elections would function like their western counterparts, no such assertions are now made. Indeed, over the past decade the opposite has appeared to be the case.The four articles in our Anniversary Symposium capture the breadth of such a prolonged evolution. Our intention as editors was to use the anniversary as a pretext to provide space for scholarly reflection and for think-pieces on various topics related to post-communist politics, written by scholars that have been related to East European Politics. We were blessed to secure contributions from these five names. From various different perspectives they chart the specificity of what being 'post-communist' means today. They capture how the legacies of communism, post-communism, Europeanisation and the so-called 'illiberal turn' have cultivated civil societies that barely resemble their western counterparts, and political processes and institutions that function in ways that defy notions of transition or even...

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