The Vienna negotiations on the final status for Kosovo

Abstract

The Vienna negotiations on the final status for Kosovo were an impossible project. It was clear at the outset that both parties would not be able to find common ground on the status issue. However, the talks focused on the practical issues of governance in Kosovo, such as decentralization, community rights and cultural heritage. It was thought that these could be addressed, initially at least, in a status‐neutral way. While the parties did not manage to agree on all or most of these problems, the UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, generated a comprehensive proposal offering compromise solutions that should have been acceptable to both sides. The recommendation of the Special Envoy in favour of supervised independence was deliberately separated from the comprehensive proposal. It was thought that the UN Security Council would at least endorse the proposal, even if it was ultimately unwilling to pronounce itself in favour of independence. The issue of status might then be settled outside the Council. However, when it appeared to some states on the Council that endorsement of the substantive Ahtisaari plan would in fact be tantamount to acceptance of independence, this avenue was closed.

From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's relations with the West

“…67 Russia has, however, continually found itself trapped between changing perceptions in the West of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination-perceptions partly shaped by the excesses of the Milosevic regime-and what Weller rightly describes as 'issues of practical politics, concerning the relative power of the principal actors of this drama and of their allies, and their respective skill in operating within a changing international system'. 68 Moscow's response to the dilemmas of power and principle was displayed in the conflict over South Ossetia in the late summer of 2008. A detailed analysis of these events and the parallels with the Kosovo case is beyond the scope of this article, and only a brief consideration is offered here.…”

Whose Rule, Whose Law? Contested Statehood, External Leverage and the European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*

“…The UN-backed talks began in February 2006, but soon they soon run into insoluble difficulties (Weller, 2008). This prompted the international community to seek an externally imposed solution through a new UNSC Resolution that would replace the 'old' Resolution 1244.…”

Decentralization as a conflict transformation tool: The challenge in Kosovo

“…Because Kosovo's overriding objective was to ensure independence, the international community advised Kosovo negotiators to “be generous” by co‐operating and conceding on the technical issues discussed (Weller, 2008: 669, 672). Kosovo's representatives thus made reluctant concessions on the number, delimitation, and powers of majority Serb municipalities that would be self‐governed through asymmetric decentralization.…”

“…Kosovo's representatives thus made reluctant concessions on the number, delimitation, and powers of majority Serb municipalities that would be self‐governed through asymmetric decentralization. After initially resisting, they also allowed Serb‐dominated local government units to join inter‐municipal partnerships, hoping that ceding these powers garnered international support for Kosovo's independence (Weller, 2008: 671).…”

“…Overall, K‐Serbs reported an increased willingness to work with K‐Albanians, at least until the Ahtisaari proposal recommended independence (Figure 2). In the lead‐up to March 2007, K‐Serb respondents also placed less blame on K‐Albanians for ethnic tensions, instead assigning greater responsibility to Belgrade (Figure 3b), perhaps because they acknowledged the Serbian delegation's sometimes obstructionist negotiating tactics (Weller, 2008). K‐Albanians also increasingly held Belgrade responsible for inter‐ethnic tensions during this period, correspondingly reducing their blame of K‐Serbs (Figure 3a).…”